Unprepared

"Evidently they had never heard that an Arab soldier is supposed to run away after a short engagement with the Israelis," reads a quotation from an anonymous IDF soldier, in this US Army-sponsored report on the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war. If you have time, read the whole thing. While it doesn't say much that is new about the conflict, it provides a level of detail not often seen and compiles much of the available information into one source.

All in all, the report tells the story of a remarkably efficient Hezbollah fighters, coupled with a fickle and unprepared Israeli battle plan. Much of the blame falls to Chief of the General Staff Dan Halutz, whose "steadfast confidence in air power, coupled with his disdain for land warfare, increased the strength of the IAF at the expense of the ground forces." The ever-quotable Timor Goksel remarks that the IDF bulldozed to Beirut in one day in 1982, but in 2006 couldn't go more than a few miles in almost a week.

The report does not focus on what everyone in Lebanon wants to know -- namely, what Israel would do in the event of another confrontation with Hezbollah. However, the obvious failure of Israeli air power, coupled with limited ground incursions, to deal Hezbollah a fatal blow suggests that there would only be one option left on the table in the event of a reprise: a land, sea, and air invasion of South Lebanon, the Bekaa, and Beirut's southern suburbs.