Deal Or No Deal?

This is a story that has flown under the radar, at least in the English-language press. The March 14 forces have always suggested that Aoun cut a deal with Syria and its Lebanese allies before his return in 2005. The Syrians, the argument goes, believed that Aoun's return could fracture the March 14 alliance. On the other side of the aisle, high-ranking Aounists have give me an especially, well, categorical denial of this charge: "This is bullshit."

I believe the Aounists on this one. If there was a secret deal in 2005 between Damascus and Aoun, it doesn't explain Aoun's behavior for the past two and a half years. Nobody can offer a reasonable explanation for what leverage Syria would have over Aoun, after his return, to compel him to break his alliance with March 14 and sign the Memorandum of Understanding with Hezbollah. No, the more likely explanation is that he did that all by himself.

Nevertheless. Fayez Azzi, who would be in a position to know, believes differently. Azzi, who has ties both to the FPM and Damascus, served as an intermediary between Aoun and Syria in 2004 and 2005 -- before the Hariri assassination.

"He claimed that in December 2004, Aoun had cut a deal with the Syrian regime to facilitate his return. 'The Syrians agreed on General Aoun’s return to Lebanon and would contribute to ending all financial and judicial pursuits against him,' said Azzi. 'In return, he would scale down his political rhetoric regarding a sovereign, free and independent Lebanon...and strike no alliance with Rafik Hariri or Walid Jumblatt.' While Syria would not impose its allies on his electoral lists, he would be forced to participate in parliamentary elections as an independent force. (Emphasis mine)

As Azzi said, the killing of Hariri changed everything. He was replaced as mediator, and doesn't know what happened after that date. But, for those looking for evidence of a Syrian-FPM alliance before Aoun's return, it certainly is interesting circumstantial evidence.