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February 2008 Archives
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February 23, 2008
The Best Things in Life Are Free (But Give Me Money)
The excellent Laura Rozen, in War and Piece, came across the US administration's budget request for the 2009 financial year, for foreign affairs, foreign operations, and foreign aid. Lebanon comes in for $142 million, money meant for "countering threats to Lebanon's sovereignty and security from armed groups backed by Iran and Syria."
Rozen also notes that the administration is requesting a $826 million budget for its foreign affairs in Pakistan.
There are approximately 162 million people in Pakistan. The US investment in Pakistan would be, therefore, about $5.10 per person. There are around four million people in Lebanon. That means that the per capita expenditure of the US in Lebanon will be around $35.50 -- or about seven times greater than for each Pakistani.
We love you. We really love you.
Whatever You Do...
...don't create a spoof Facebook profile of Moroccan Prince Moulay Rachid. Because, you know, you'll be arrested, blindfolded, beaten unconscious, and then sentenced to three years in jail.
Just to be on the safe side, you probably shouldn't even poke the Prince, either.
February 22, 2008
It's Like Beirut Out There
I was watching the HBO series The Wire last night -- incidentally, probably the best show to ever appear on TV -- about the drug trade, politics, and life in Baltimore. The Mayor, fuming over the police department's inability to solve a murder, complains (paraphrase): "It's not like we're in Beirut!" Cheap shot! I walk around Beirut at night and feel perfectly safe, but there are parts of Baltimore that I wouldn't consider visiting after the sun goes down.
In other news, the New York Times has an amusing story of art imitating life -- a little too closely for some nearby Lebanese Army soldiers. Okay, it made me smile. But still, it would be nice if some newspaper would publish a story mentioning that Lebanon is not, in fact, all snipers and car bombs.
February 20, 2008
Deal Or No Deal?
This is a story that has flown under the radar, at least in the English-language press. The March 14 forces have always suggested that Aoun cut a deal with Syria and its Lebanese allies before his return in 2005. The Syrians, the argument goes, believed that Aoun's return could fracture the March 14 alliance. On the other side of the aisle, high-ranking Aounists have give me an especially, well, categorical denial of this charge: "This is bullshit."
I believe the Aounists on this one. If there was a secret deal in 2005 between Damascus and Aoun, it doesn't explain Aoun's behavior for the past two and a half years. Nobody can offer a reasonable explanation for what leverage Syria would have over Aoun, after his return, to compel him to break his alliance with March 14 and sign the Memorandum of Understanding with Hezbollah. No, the more likely explanation is that he did that all by himself.
Nevertheless. Fayez Azzi, who would be in a position to know, believes differently. Azzi, who has ties both to the FPM and Damascus, served as an intermediary between Aoun and Syria in 2004 and 2005 -- before the Hariri assassination.
"He claimed that in December 2004, Aoun had cut a deal with the Syrian regime to facilitate his return. 'The Syrians agreed on General Aoun’s return to Lebanon and would contribute to ending all financial and judicial pursuits against him,' said Azzi. 'In return, he would scale down his political rhetoric regarding a sovereign, free and independent Lebanon...and strike no alliance with Rafik Hariri or Walid Jumblatt.' While Syria would not impose its allies on his electoral lists, he would be forced to participate in parliamentary elections as an independent force. (Emphasis mine)
As Azzi said, the killing of Hariri changed everything. He was replaced as mediator, and doesn't know what happened after that date. But, for those looking for evidence of a Syrian-FPM alliance before Aoun's return, it certainly is interesting circumstantial evidence.
February 17, 2008
This Is Brilliant

How flags explain the world: A 25 year-old Brazilian named Icaro Doria is behind the "Meet the World" Campaign:
"We started to research relevant, global, and current facts and, thus, came up with the idea to put new meanings to the colours of the flags. We used real data taken from the websites of Amnesty International and the UNO"
February 16, 2008
Everything You Wanted To Know About Imad Mugniyah (And Were Too Afraid To Ask)
Okay, not everything you wanted to know about Mugniyah, which would undoubtedly include more facts about his role in Hezbollah and international terrorism, and the identity of his assassins. Nevertheless, there have been some pretty good analyses of Mugniyah in the international press recently:
- Martin Kramer points out that Hezbollah's posthumous embrace of Mugniyah is an embarassment to scholars who bought Hezbollah's company line, during the past two decades, that they had no idea who Mugniyah was.
"One of [Hezbollah's] paramount interests is concealing from scrutiny that apparatus of terror that Mughniyah spent his life building. Hiding the clandestine branch protects it from Hezbollah's enemies, and makes it easier to sell the movement to useful idiots in the West, who insist that the movement hasn't done any terror in years, and maybe never did any at all," writes Kramer.
- Nicholas Blanford floats the idea that Syria was behind Mugniyah's assassination, as part of some broader deal with the Americans involving the international tribunal. He gets Walid Jumblatt's tentative support for the idea: "It could have been the Syrians," he said. "Damascus is well protected, and I don't think somebody else could do it." I mean, come on.
- Andrew Exum begins a long, informative thread where he and commentators including Michael Young, David Schenker, and Lee Smith bat around ideas regarding who could have killed Mugniyah. The general consensus seems to be that Syria is not in the business of giving high-profile gifts to the West, and especially ones that are irrevocable. Furthermore, the fact that Mugniyah was killed in the middle of Damascus is an embarassment to the Syrian regime -- if they wanted him dead, they would have killed him elsewhere. "Occam's Razor seems to apply here: Given what we know now, the simplest answer is probably the correct one," writes Exum. And that, of course, is Mossad.
- The LA Times compiled a list of Mugniyah's alleged "greatest hits" (excuse the pun). Ex-CIA officer Robert Baer and Magnus Ranstorp, who wrote a Hezbollah primer, seem to be the go-to guys in the press for commentary on Mugniyah. Quoth Ranstorp: "Certainly within the U.S. intelligence community, some were as eager to get Imad Mughniyah as they were Bin Laden...I'm sure there will be champagne corks popping [in Washington]"
Remember the Tent Camp?
I cut through the tent camp last night, at around 8pm. There could not have been more than two dozen people total staying there, and that's being generous. Each of the smaller parties -- SSNP, Marada -- seemed to keep one guy each there, as a sort of symbolic contribution. There were a few more FPM and Hezbollah protesters. Most of them were gathered at the entrance near the road which leads up to Sodeco. I didn't wander through the back part of Hezbollah's section, which contains a long line of tents, so maybe there were more people back there. But I doubt it.
Okay, the right to protest is sacred. But the right to pitch long lines of empty tents in the city center, paralyzing one of Beirut's major economic districts? Not so much. If the government wants to add teeth to their rhetorical escalation, they should tell the opposition: You are more than welcome to protest in downtown. But all those tents that are unoccupied at night will be removed, and the remaining protesters will be consolidated in a smaller area around the Serail. If Hezbollah and Amal want to keep their camp, at least let them pour the resources into keeping it at capacity.
While we're on the subject: if the tent camp is on life support, the Place de l'Etoile has flatlined. There was not one person in the square, excepting soldiers, at the prime dinner hour on Friday night. It is not quite clear why a couple of dozen opposition supporters can shut down the entire district.
February 10, 2008
Headline Lies
Walid Jumblatt's recent remarks referred to Hezbollah as a "militia," and said to the opposition, "If you want chaos, we welcome chaos. If you want war, we welcome one." I'd like to talk about the reason for these remarks at a later time, but for now I'd just like to point attention to the Daily Star's grossly misleading headline to their story: "Jumblatt welcomes return to 'war and chaos' in Lebanon."
That's a flat-out lie, as anybody who saw Jumblatt's remarks would know. Even the Daily Star should be able to understand a simple "If X, then Y" statement. Jumblatt also said that "if they [the opposition] want peace, the March 14 Forces are ready for that as well." But I guess turning that into a headline wouldn't sell as many papers.
Hiding Behind Words
Joshua Landis laments the "missed opportunity" of compromise in Lebanon:
The notion that Lebanon could be pried away from Syria without offering Damascus either security or the return of the Golan was a mirage.
...
It is clear that the Levant's future hinges on establishing a spirit of compromise. This is the lesson of the failure of force in Iraq. Compromise means satisfying the minimal terms demanded by Syria and the Lebanese opposition. Refusing to do so will have grave consequences for Lebanon, its neighbors and the United States."
Those who believe Lebanon is a democracy may be a little confused. In the first election in which Syria did not have the deciding vote, Lebanon elected an anti-Syrian government. In 2009, the Lebanese opposition will have another chance to win a greater number of seats in Lebanon's Parliament, and regain power legally. So then, what are these "grave consequences" that Landis mentions?
Of course, it is not much of a mystery. What Professor Landis means is that, if the opposition's "minimal terms" are not met, some of the majority's leaders will be shot in the head by Syria or its proxies. Other March 14 politicians will be ripped apart when a car packed with explosives detonates beside them. And then there is the possibility of random, chaotic violence among Lebanese that neither side's elites can fully control, which risks hurtling the country into civil war.
I do not expect Professor Landis to define with any specificity these "grave consequences." He is an American, and hardball politics in his home country is at least played with a semblance of rules. He is an academic, and explicit threats of violence are generally frowned upon in the ivory tower. From my limited contact with him, he also seems to be a gentleman, and what lies behind his equivocations is far from gentlemanly. For all these reasons, the true meaning of his words must be embarassing. In Lebanon, they fool nobody.
February 6, 2008
The Mystery Continues
His Lebanon reporting aside, I have a lot of respect for Seymour Hersh. He's undeniably skilled at getting the story surrounding complex national security issues. He has shown the ability to do it, even when entire governments are seemingly united in their determination to prevent him from getting the story. So when such a skilled investigative reporter blatantly strikes out on uncovering what happened in northern Syria on the night of September 6, 2007, you know that some secret is being well-kept.
What we know is that four Israeli planes bombed some Syrian military installation on that date. After what was essentially an act of war, all the major parties -- Syria included -- played down the attack and refused to say exactly what was targeted. Strange stuff. And after interviewing high-ranking figures in Damascus and Tel Aviv, Hersh doesn't really uncover any information that wouldn't already have been available to him by a Google search. His working theory is that Israel might have hit a North Korean-built building that would have dealt with chemical weapons.
"In Syria, I was able to get some confirmation that North Koreans were at the target. A senior officer in Damascus with firsthand knowledge of the incident agreed to see me alone, at his home; my other interviews in Damascus took place in government offices. According to his account, North Koreans were present at the site, but only as paid construction workers. The senior officer said that the targeted building, when completed, would most likely have been used as a chemical-warfare facility. (Syria is not a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention and has been believed, for decades, to have a substantial chemical-weapons arsenal.)"
I suppose it is as likely an explanation as the dozens of others out there. But the real news is Hersh's inability to come up with anything concrete. This might be a story that nobody ever reaches the bottom of.
February 3, 2008
Arrested Development
If I was going to be cynical about the arrest of eleven army soldiers and six civilians for the riots in Chiyah last week -- and it usually pays to be cynical about anything politics-related -- I would say that this is a wonderful way of splitting the difference between the opposition and the government. Hezbollah and Amal were obviously demanding blood (pardon the pun) for the killings of their supporters in Chiyah, and held their support for Suleiman's Presidential hopes as ammunition. The unpleasantness of throwing a few soldiers under the bus pales in comparison to the implosion of Suleiman's candidacy for President.
That said, there is no indication whatsoever that these soldiers weren't arrested for perfectly legitimate reasons. News reports quoted anonymous sources saying that some of the victims killed in the riots were hit with M-16 bullets -- the standard assault rifle of the Lebanese Army. Sometimes, fair investigations reach politically convenient results.
The past few weeks have told us a great deal about President-in-waiting Suleiman's political skills. He has shown himself to be proficient at treading the middle ground between the political poles. He knows how to send the proper signals to the opposition, without endangering his support from the majority. Take his declaration that the Winograd Report marked a victory for the Lebanese Army over Israel. That the Lebanese Army had anything to do with Israel's defeat is, of course, incorrect -- but it does signal the opposition that his anti-Israel views are sincere. Some in March 14 may roll their eyes, but they're not about to do anything else. Ridiculous statement, good politics.
Goodbye To All That
Lebanese-born BBC Reporter Kim Ghattas is leaving Beirut for Washington D.C. She penned a goodbye to the city that made her a reporter: "I still remember the day I decided to become a journalist. I was 13 and I was tired of my Dutch cousins asking me about whether I went to school and if we had enough food."
February 2, 2008
President Nasrallah?
Might as well rename Lebanon "Hezbollahland," according to the Western press
"At election time, Hezbollah and its allies regularly win the maximum number of parliamentary seats allocated to them under Lebanon's complicated and grossly unfair political system that divvies up seats among the major religious groups. If Lebanon were suddenly to liberalize its political system and hold a presidential election on the basis of one person, one vote, it's not a stretch to imagine President Hassan Nasrallah -- except that the Hezbollah leader doesn't want the job. Besides, the last two presidents were ardent supporters of Hezbollah, as were all the prime ministers before Siniora. Even Siniora himself probably supported Hezbollah's right to resist Israel in the south until its supporters started trying to force him from office." (emphasis mine)
This dodges the inconvenient fact of the Syrian occupation before 2005. Sure, all presidents and prime ministers supported Hezbollah before Siniora --and if they hadn't been, Syria would have blown them up. It's hypocritical to attack sectarianism, while describing the decades of Syrian occupation -- where their operatives worked nonstop to subvert Lebanese democracy -- as the true will of the people.
Nasrallah wouldn't come any closer to winning a free and fair Presidential election than Samir Geagea would. The sectarian system warps popular representation in Lebanon, but the fact remains that Hezbollah won only 14 seats out of 128 in the 2005 Parliamentary election. For all their weapons and external funding, their protest camp in downtown Beirut is currently nothing more than a ragged collection of tents and a few sullen kids trying to stay warm. Some majority.
No Victors
So the Winograd Commission has released its final report. The big news in Israel is that Ehud Olmert will probably survive. For Lebanon, it does not really matter. Other than schaudenfreude, it's not likely that Lebanon would get anything out of a different Israeli Prime Minister, than out of Olmert. The real effects of the war -- loss of life, destruction of Lebanese economic and civilian infrastructure, billions of dollars in damages and lost profits, the strengthening of Hizbullah -- were evident over a year ago. Nobody needed a report to tell them.
Meanwhile, Hizbullah took the opportunity to declare victory. It makes you wonder about how they see the world. They don't care about the economic destruction, about the possibility of perpetual war in the region -- how, after all, would Hizbullah be able to justify their weapons without perpetual war? If Israel lost the war, they must have won. And there will not be any peace in the region before Hezbollah and its allies destroy Israel fully, or Israel destroys them fully. There are many in Israel who agree with them, too.
Iran took the occassion to brag that it had completed over 400 projects since the end of the war. Meanwhile, the government's response to reconstruction has been sluggish. Most of the Paris III funds remained tied up in bureaucratic red tape. I wonder how long it took Iran and Syria to get money in the hands of its proxies; I wonder how concerned they were with the "absorbative capacity" of Lebanese institutions. This is the political face of the economic destruction: power slipping from those who offered normalcy and prosperity, the undermining of democracy, and a destruction of national institutions that is nearing completion. And again, this was clear to anybody paying attention over a year ago.
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