Week In Review

I apologize for neglecting my blogging duties this past week. I'm actually in the States for the holidays. I assumed that I would still be able to write regularly by checking the news online, but it's actually quite hard to stay current without talking to people every day about what they find important. That, and I'm addicted to American football.

So, let me just jot down a few notes about the intersection of American and Lebanese politics. For example, this Naharnet story about a statement from Senator Arlen Specter, and "influential U.S. Senator Patrick Kennedy" following their meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Muallem. For starters, Patrick Kennedy is not a US Senator, but a Congressman. And frankly, he is not particularly influential. But factual nitpickings aside, the real story here is Specter and Kennedy's gullible statements that "[Assad] is ready and the Syrian public opinion is ready" for a peace deal. Neither the West or the East, of course, have a monopoly on misunderstanding the other.

Changing gears: in the "American Opinion" folder in my RSS feed, the only people ever talking about Lebanon are the folks over at National Review's The Corner. Unsurprisingly -- and I'm not complaining -- it's a fairly hawkish scene. There has been talk in Washington about the hawks losing their hold on American foreign policy, but when only one group devotes attention to a specific issue, they are generally going to get their way. Now, hawkish Giuliani advisors Martin Kramer and Stephen Rosen have started a new Middle East blog, under the auspices of Harvard University's Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. This sort of foundation-building is what moves policy in the long-term.

Michael Young, Guest Blogger For the Day

From: Michael Young
Subject: Your Post

Dear David,

Many thanks for your post, and for finding my piece worthy of a "bravo." If I could just clarify a few points, however. Nowhere am I advocating abolishing the sectarian system. Rather, I believe that we need to reform the system by simultaneously abolishing it in Parliament and preserving it in a newly created Senate, where representation would be 50-50. This is the gist of the idea. You take from the Christians in one place, but you offer them security elsewhere through the Senate, where "fundamental issues" are to be decided. I threw in something not in Taif--the idea of a rotating presidency--so that the communities would be less hung up on the specific offices they have held since Independence, but also so that everyone could, by sharing senior posts, have a greater stake and interest in participating jointly in building the state.

My point is this: Christians have to shape future outcomes on representation themselves in such a way that more unfavorable outcomes are not forced upon them. The idea of thirds (with Sunnis, Shiites and Christians each getting a third of Parliament) is not necessarily bad per se; it is bad because the idea has been floated merely as one of many threats to dilute Christian power, not as a serious consensual proposal. Worse, if we get into the notion of thirds, that will only block what I believe is a much more necessary move toward fully deconfessionalizing Parliament--which I believe is the only thing that will ultimately save Christians, while their seeing their power gradually whittled down (as in the thirds scheme) would only push them into believing that they have no future in the system.

Why do I propose all this? Because I believe that new Christian-Muslim relations in the context of a non-confessional Parliament would force Christians to adopt a new attitude with respect toward their future, one far less apocalyptic than exists today. The paradox is that once you take down parliamentary quotas, Christians will be obliged to essentially regard their future as one of necessary collaboration with the Muslims; and since the Shiites and Sunnis each have their own interests, there is plenty of room for all sides to balance off the others. On top of that, I'm convinced that many Muslim leaders would continue to take Christians on their electoral lists to retain cross-sectarian legitimacy. That, and the presence of a Senate where a 50-50 ratio is set, I think would make Christians much more confident about their future.

So, far from limiting this to a "tactical retreat" by Christians, as you have me suggest, I see this as a fundamental re-evaluation by Christians of their relations with the Muslim communities, their position in Lebanon, and their future in a mostly Muslim region.

I'm not sure how deconfessionalism coming from the Christians would bother the Muslim communities. I do think the Sunnis and Shiites, however, would be very wary of each other, and would perhaps hesitate to give up power in Parliament. After all, despite what you hear about the Shiites being the largest community, until we have a census I have great doubts that Sunnis and Shiites are that far apart demographically. In the absence of certainty, the Muslim communities might prefer the status quo,. The obstacles to my plan is that no one really is confident enough to give up the present system, despite all the talk to the contrary.

Unfortunately, there can be no discussion of such issues while Hizbullah, and therefore the Shiites, holds far more weapons than the other communities. No one will cede power to the Shiites in such a case, and any talk of constitutional reform is impossible. Hence the need for Hizbullah to accept a process for its disarmament, and I mean a consensual process of disarmament, even if this takes time.

-Michael Young

Decision Time

After a few months of ineffective French diplomacy, which did a great deal to neuter the government's negotiating position, there have been some indications that March 14 and its foreign allies are finally strengthening their spine. Whether this is just a bluff, or a serious move to confront the obstruction of the Presidential election, we will see in the next few days.

The first sign was Sarkozy's recent statement that today was Assad's "last chance" to facilitate Lebanon's Presidential election. Next, the Siniora government announced that it might appoint a successor to Pierre Gemayel's Cabinet position is the election on Saturday wasn't held. Finally, the Americans returned to Lebanese diplomacy, with a visit from David Welch to Beirut and a statement by President Bush reiterating his support for a 50 + 1 President.

The aggressive French President was already ignored once, when he announced that last Monday was Lebanon's "last chance" to elect a President. He can't afford to be stood up twice, without without making the repercussions of ignoring him clear. Similarly, the March 14 forces can't afford to have the opposition call their bluff on the Gemayel appointment, only to back down. Soon enough, we will know if the erosion of March 14's position that began just before Annapolis is going to continue, or if the government is going to stand up to Syria & Co.

Towards A Non-Sectarian Lebanon

Bravo to Michael Young for advocating the abolition of Lebanon's sectarian system:

"Christians, particularly Maronites, have also believed that their salvation would come from a new president. Yet the infighting over the presidency has been so divisive that Syria has taken advantage of this to gradually re-impose its hegemony over Lebanon.

For Christians to survive as a community, they must accept that the only way to do so is through reform of the confessional arrangement within the framework of Taif. This means abolishing sectarian quotas in Parliament before this becomes a demand Christians cannot deflect."

I like Young's conclusion, but I'm not sold on how he got there -- or whether his argument could conceivably have popular appeal among the non-Christian community. It is something of a paradox: in order to ensure the survival of their sectarian community, the Christians must advocate the abolition of sectarian privileges. It is less a cri de coeur for religious equality and liberal democracy than another political maneuver -- a tactical retreat designed to consolidate Christian influence due to unfavorable circumstances.

For this reason, I'm not sure how Young's argument could possibly influence a Sunni or Shia Lebanese to abolish sectarian quotas. The distribution of power is a zero-sum game: if the Christians would be better off with a non-sectarian system, that means that somebody else would be better under another system. Young's nightmare scenario of a system where Christians, Sunnis, and Shias each are represented by a third of the seats in Parliament would represent a windfall for the other two sects. Because he does not criticize sectarian confessionalism per se, his argument has limited relevance to a member of one of Lebanon's other sects.

Young has written much about the current struggle's implications for Lebanon's post civil-war power-sharing agreement, and I think he's right to be worried. In a deadlock primarily characterized by a Sunni-Shia confrontation, the Taef Accord's archaic provision of allotting 50% of Parliament's seats to "Muslims" does not reflect Lebanon's true political divide. When the dust clears, it will be clear that Lebanon's overarching problem is this gap between the power-sharing agreement in the Constitution and the reality on the ground. And anyone with even a cursory knowledge of Lebanese history remembers what happened the last time this was true.

Unbalanced Priorities

There are, I suppose, good reasons for the Western world and its allies to hand over $7.4 billion to the Palestinian Authority. They want to strengthen Mahmoud Abbas vis-a-vis Hamas, they think that these funds can be used as internal leverage to pressure the PA to make internal reforms, and they want to continue the "momentum" begun at the Annapolis Conference. Very well. There are also critics of Monday's conference, who argue that the donors' aid only rewards bad behavior, will only be used to line the pockets of corrupt officials, and strengthens an organization that has never been truly committed to a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. I don't pretend that I am able to weigh these competing claims.

That said, any Lebanese reading about the largesse recently promised to the Palestinians must immediately think about the Paris III conference, and the aid pledged to Lebanon after the 2006 summer war. That package amounted to 7.6 billion -- slightly more than the Palestinians just received. But what's a few hundred million among friends? Lebanon has a population of around 4 million, and had recently been bombarded by one of the world's most advanced militaries for over a month. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip have a population of around 3.5 million and, while undergoing an Israeli economic blockade, have not experienced anywhere near the destruction that affected Lebanon.

More importantly, a strong Lebanon has the prospect of being a genuine, democratic ally of the West. The Lebanese government has more potential on its worst days than the Palestinian Authority has on its best. Realistically, the best Europe and America can hope for the PA is that it becomes an effective dictatorship which accepts a two-state solution in Palestine (and even that is stretching the boundaries of realism). They want to turn the PA into another Jordan. Forgive me for not being enthralled by the grandiose scope of this vision.

But, of course, Europe and America buy into the notion that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is central to the problems that plague the Middle East. If only it can be solved, the thinking goes, Bashar al-Assad will release his political prisoners, Michel Aoun will stop obstructing the Presidential election, and Hassan Nasrallah will be replaced -- not with Naim Kassem, but perhaps Bassem Sabeh. I am, let us say, unconvinced.

Fog Of War

Sorry for not writing more frequently this week. The story to comment on, of course, the assassination of General Francois al-Hajj. Sadly, I don't have any more knowledge on who killed the man than is available in the wire reports. For some reason, Bashar doesn't take my phone calls any more. And I have precisely zero interest in fitting his assassination into some pre-packaged ideological framework that will sound plausible only to those who already agree with me. Apparently, I'm not the only one. Simply put, there is not enough information here for me to write anything intelligent.

In more concrete news, the gap between March 8 and March 14 is only widening. Aoun's appointment as the chief negotiator with March 14 would be funny, if it wasn't so sad. The hope of the pro-government forces was that Amal and Hezbollah could convince Aoun, who has the most to lose in a Suleiman Presidency, to go along with the deal. Allowing him to speak for the whole opposition is tantamount to announcing that there will be no resolution any time soon.

Meanwhile, in Syria, there has been a new crackdown on dissent. More than 30 dissidents from a broad spectrum of political backgrounds -- Commmunists to Islamists -- were rounded up by the authorities. Whatever deal America and Syria cut at Annapolis (if any at all), it certainly had nothing to do with Syria's human rights record.

From Turkey To Damascus (And Back Again)

For my money (which, when it comes to reading blogs, is of course nothing), Hannah Allam tells some of the best stories about life and culture in the Middle East. Check out this report on Iraqi interpreter "MAK," who worked with the United States Army -- and then feared for his life in Baghdad, because of the possibility of retribution from anti-US insurgents. After failing to find a legal way out of the Middle East, MAK -- now living quietly in Damascus -- paid $6,000 to a Turkish smuggler who promised to arrange transport to Istanbul, and then into Greece. The result of this gamble may be predictable; the story is not.

A Cartoonish Situation

Lebanon's Presidential election postponed for the seventh time.

(Cartoon from Al-Dustour, Jordan, December 6, 2007. Courtesy MEMRI)

Taymoor Jumblatt and the "Great Arab Leader" Bashar Assad

Note: I'm keeping this post on the site as an example of the misinformation that floats around Lebanon, but please read the note at the bottom before taking it at face value.

The only opinion I've heard in Beirut regarding Taymoor Jumblatt, the son of Walid, is that he's a soft-spoken guy with little interest in politics, or inheriting the role of his father. That's why I was surprised to see him making some surprisingly strong pro-Syrian comments in a California-based, Arabic-language newspaper called Al-Watan(translation courtesy Mideast Wire):

Q: Do you think [Walid Jumblatt] could ever restore his role as Syria's ally or at least as one of the Lebanese political leaders?

A: Unfortunately, Walid Bek went too far this time in playing the role of the American dummy. He carried the banner of the elimination of the Lebanese resistance and planted hatred in the hearts of the Syrian officials and people. Today, he is considered to be one of the most hated men by the pro-opposition Lebanese Maronites, Shi'is and Sunnis. What I fear the most is to see the Druze paying the price for the mistakes of Walid Junblatt.

...

Q: Will we see you in Damascus soon?

A: I hope so and I would be glad to see the mountain of Kamal Junblatt regain its historical and strategic relations with the den of the lions in Syria. Damascus is a strategic city for the Druze and Syria is our natural ally. I hope I will be able to fix things and apologize to all the Syrians, especially to the great Arab leader Dr. Bashar al-Assad.

Yikes. Taymoor isn't walking the thin line between March 8 and March 14 here -- he's moving himself explicitly into the opposition camp. This is qualitatively different from the current Druze strategy of moderating their political image, and opening up contacts with the opposition.

Two possible explanations: the conventional wisdom that Taymoor is politically apathetic is incorrect, and he legitimately holds strongly pro-Syrian beliefs and believes that his father's stances have endangered the Druze community. Second, Walid Jumblatt sees that the political winds are shifting and realizes that he can only credibly walk back his pro-American stances so far. Therefore, he encouraged his son to establish a stronger rapport with the Syrians. In case they return to Lebanon, the Druze will need a leader with believable pro-Syrian bona fides to escape the inevitable vengeance that the Syrians will mete out to those who opposed them. My entirely unsubstantiated guess is that the latter is true; the Druze are a fairly united political group, and it seems unlikely that Taymoor would stray from the reservation on his own.

UPDATE: It appears that this is a story that was "too good to check." I've received information that Progressive Socialist Party officials are claiming that this interview was fabricated by Syrian or Iranian sources. It doesn't appear that Taymoor ever said what was attributed to him in the article, or in my post. Kudos to commenter "MK" and "John" for catching this before I did, and apologies for misleading people.

Will Aoun Oppose Suleiman?

According to Naharnet, Aoun accepts the nomination of General Suleiman -- as long as his election is "in line with my intitiative." To review, here are some of the highlights of Aoun's initiative: the new President's term will in expire in about two years, after the Parliamentary elections, Saad Hariri chooses a new Prime Minister who is not a member of his Future Movement, and a unity government is formed with 55% representation for the majority, and 45% for the minority.

It doesn't take a genius to figure out that not all of these things are going to happen. The two-year Presidential term doesn't seem to have any support outside of Aounist circles, and if the opposition gets Michel Suleiman as President and a minority veto in the cabinet, it will be hard to view the past year's standoff as anything but an unqualified victory for the opposition.

No matter what he does, I doubt whether Aoun has the power to stop the Suleiman juggernaut at this point. In retrospect, Suleiman's campaign was really a work of art (minimalist art, of course). Along with March 14, Aoun's erstwhile ally Michel Murr and Amal's Nabih Berri seem to be on board for his election. I could see Hezbollah sticking with Aoun as long as their opposition doesn't actually jeopardize Suleiman's candidacy. For them, the best of both worlds would be to maintain their alliance with Aoun while still making sure Suleiman becomes President. But would he risk everything to fight an unwinnable battle?Or, phrased another way: Is Aoun in 2007 any different from Aoun in 1990?

Blindsided

According to Joshua Landis, the Lebanese delegation at Annapolis was "blindsided" by the news that March 14 had lent their support to Gen. Sleiman's candidacy for President.

"As officials began to arrive at Annapolis and started circulating, E.U, and then Egyptian officials began to approach their Lebanese counterparts. 'Congratulations on your new president,' they were informed.

The jaws of the Lebanese delegates dropped. It was the first any of them had heard of such news."

Keep in mind that Landis's sources are probably Syrian, who may have an interest in embarassing the Lebanese delegation. Nevertheless, he reports that Egypt masterminded the deal, and "had been in favor of Suleiman from the start." What I've heard from March 14 sources is that, during Hariri's trip to Moscow, Putin also came out in favor of Michel Suleiman.

It's not hard to see a pattern developing. The leaders with a military background are pushing for one of their own to take up Lebanon's Presidency. And what does Bashar al-Assad, a graduate of Homs military academy and former colonel in the Syrian Army, think of General Suleiman? Well, he is at least canny enough not to hug Suleiman too tightly at this moment, and jeopardize his support within the March 14 Movement. However, there is this quote from Syrian political analyst Sami Moubayed in Time Magazine: "The Syrians are very happy...I think this is what the Syrians always wanted -- Suleiman."

Not a lot here to inspire confidence, is there?

Where the "Syrian Track" Stands

One of the primary motivations behind last week's Annapolis Conference was to strengthen Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas in his internal struggle against Hamas, which took over the Gaza Strip in 2007. As such, Israeli - Syrian negotiations were given less attention, and would not have been included at all if Syria hadn't made a discussion of the Golan Heights a prerequisite for showing up. Still, there does seem to be movement on this front behind the scenes. But how serious are these talks?

It's not an idle question. March 14 leaders are basing their decision to support Michel Sleiman for President on the assumption that the Americans and the Syrians struck a deal at Annapolis. If the two rivals are heading for a rapprochement, the thinking goes, America isn't going to support a confrontational approach towards Lebanon's Presidential election. However, there isn't a great deal of public information that supports the claim that the American-Syrian relationship will undergo any dramatic changes.

Here's what's going on: Moscow might host a follow-up conference that would emphasize Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Moscow was a Cold War ally of Syria, and obviously has more pull over the Syrian regime than the American government. The New York Times quotes national security advisor Stephen Hadley saying that if Syria will, "give up their support for terror, let Lebanon alone, [and] support a new Iraqi government," then "there are opportunities for them in the Golan Heights."

Notice the formula: if Syria respects Lebanese independence, they can win back the Golan Heights. Lebanon is where Syria needs to make concessions, not what they win for good behavior elsewhere. This hardly seems to be a development that requires anti-Syrian Lebanese leaders to panic and endorse Michel Sleiman. In fact, they just might be squandering a golden opportunity to secure Lebanese sovereignty once and for all.

Mr. Smith Goes To Beirut

I criticized W. Thomas Smith's Lebanon blog, hosted by National Review Online, a few months ago. It's good to see that other American journalists are picking up on the scent. Yesterday, National Review ran a retraction of some of Smith's posts, and Smith commented on the matter himself.

The retraction is slightly bizarre, because it doesn't name the journalist who brought the inaccuracies of Smith's reporting, or mention the exact criticisms. But apparently, Smith wrote on September 25, 2006, that Beirut's downtown was occupied by "some 200-plus heavily armed Hezbollah militiamen." Now, it turns out that he did not see 200 armed Hezbollahi in downtown per se -- rather, he saw two AK-47s while in a moving vehicle on the highway above the camp. And he was informed, by "very reliable sources" which he of course cannot name, that Hezbollah kept weapons in the tents. He writes, "If I mistakenly conveyed that impression [that he saw many armed Hezbollahi] to my readers, I apologize." How could anyone come away with that impression?

If you think that is bad, check out the news that he broke on September 29. On that date, in case you missed the news, 4,000 - 5,000 Hezbollah gunmen "deployed to the Christian areas of Beirut." Did he see any Hezbollah gunmen?* Well, he saw what he thought were Hezbollah militiamen at road intersections in Achrafieh while passing from a moving car. Now, I was not in this moving car, from which it appears that Mr. Smith does all his reporting. But since he no longer appears willing to stand by his assertion that he actually saw any "Hezbollah gunmen," let me go out on a limb and suggest they were actually Lebanese Army soldiers. Keep in mind, Mr. Smith used to be a United States Marine. The inability to distinguish Hezbollah from the Lebanese Army either means one is being spectacularly stupid, or intentionally sensationalistic.

Anyone with the slightest knowledge of Lebanon knows that these events didn't happen. So, who fed Mr. Smith this bogus news. According to him, they are "reliable sources within the Cedar Revolution movement, as well as insiders within the Lebanese national security apparatus." None of whom, apparently, are willing to go on the record. Mr. Smith says this is because they need to preserve their safety. Very well. Let me suggest a different explanation. There are plenty of people willing to feed a naive journalist fake news; there is nobody willing to risk their reputations by going on the record with blatant lies. If 4,000 - 5,000 Hezbollah foot soldiers really did deploy to Christian areas of Beirut in September, Lebanon would be tumbling over the precipice into civil war. Christian politicians and security experts would be screaming from the rooftops, not making off the record statements to one foreign journalist/blogger.

Finally, Smith brings up the "flag incident" which I mocked him for months ago, where he bragged about stealing a Hezbollah flag from the dahiyeh. He cites objections that this might put other Western journalists in danger by making Hezbollah the impression that they could be hostile to their interests. He is giving himself too much credit; his blog is nowhere near that influential. The post was actually objectionable because it was juvenile and designed to score cheap political points.

Smith claims to have had wonderful access to top security officials in Lebanon, including Michel Sleiman, "multiple high-ranking military and intelligence officers," and "the special forces and counterterrorist strike force commanders." Those are great contacts; good for him. But with all those available resources, he chose to write about how he stole one of the million Hezbollah flags from dahiyeh? He could have advanced a policy suggesting how to sap Hezbollah's political and military strength. Instead, he chose to thrill his readers in Ohio, rather than do any serious damage to Hezbollah in Beirut. Smith took the lazy way out -- which, come to think about it, sums up his Lebanon reporting very well.

P.S. Welcome to all of Andrew Sullivan's readers. Thanks for showing up!

*Typo fixed.