The Computer Nerds Are Arming

"Stop Offending HizbullaH Not To Be Under Attack!! You Can't Challenge Us!! Shhhhhhh Eh?!?!"

Apparently, computer-proficient Hezbollahi don't handle dissent any better than the normal Party of God functionary. This pro-March 14 website was hacked, and the above message was left on the site. Everyone is holding their breath for the accusation that March 14 hacked their own website to generate sympathy. This anti-Harri, Canadian-based website was also crashed, as the circle of violence continues... (hat tip: Angry Arab)

Bkirki Punts

The Bkirki-led negotiations did not fail, per se; they fizzled. Everyone released cheery statements, and then retreated to their respective corners.

The great victory of these negotiations was supposedly an agreement on the procedures through which the next President will be selected. Apparently, Patriarch Sfeir specifically prohibited the committee from discussing the names of potential Presidential candidates. Let's be clear: without a debate over specific candidates, these negotiations were simply fancy word games. Lebanon cannot elect "an agreed upon set of principles" or "selection procedures" to the Presidency.

There are signs that the negotiations did not go as smoothly as Lebanon's elected leaders would like everyone to believe. First, the opposition was quick to contradict early reports that the factions had settled the quorum issue, by resolving that all MPs should attend the Presidential election. "Christian MPs are not obliged to attend the election session," said a Marada spokesman. "It is their right to participated or to abstain from attending the session."

And then the rival factions tussled over whether to refer the committee's report to Parliament (March 14), or Nabih Berri and Saad Hariri (March 8). Successful mediation sessions generally do not end with the sides bickering over the materially irrelevant question of where to send their report. If Lebanon fails to elect a President in the next month, the disappointment of the Bkirki-led negotiations deserves a central chapter in explaining why.

When You Look Into The Abyss...

Remember when Human Rights Watch released a report criticizing Hezbollah for committing war crimes in the July War, by indiscriminately targeting Israeli citizens in North Israel? And remember when Hezbollah strong-armed the human rights organization into cancelling their press conference in Hamra, with the Siniora government's complicity? A week after that adventure, HRW released a report condemning the IDF for "indiscriminate airstrikes...[which] caused most of the approximately 900 civilian deaths in Lebanon."

The executive director of Human Rights Watch, has an editorial in today's Haaretz, comparing the response to HRW's reports in Beirut and Jerusalem. While Israel allowed the press conference to go forward, they were no more willing to accept blame for their conduct during the July War than Hezbollah:

"Faced with this troubling evidence, even the IDF was reluctant to confront the facts. The top IDF lawyers with whom we met noted several times that, unlike Hezbollah, the IDF did not deliberately try to kill civilians. But of course, the laws of war, not Hezbollah, provide the proper measure for Israeli conduct. The lawyers noted, correctly, that the IDF was under intense political pressure to end the Hezbollah rocket barrage on northern Israel, but it is precisely such difficult circumstances for which the laws of war are intended."

One meets very few people who believe that another Israel-Hezbollah conflict can be avoided. When civilians are once again indiscriminately killed in South Lebanon and North Israel, I don't want anyone to claim that they were unaware of the war's consequences.

Hassan, We Hardly Knew Ye

This is tragic, just tragic. From the New York Times:

Hassan Fattah, who has been an anchor for us in Dubai, dashing off to story after story around the region, is resigning to take up an exciting opportunity, becoming managing editor of a new English-language pan-Arab daily. Hassan originally came to our attention through his work founding Iraq Today, an English-language newspaper in Iraq. He will be mentoring young Arab journalists, and we wish him well.

Please permit me a moment of schaudenfreude. Now, permit me a moment of conspiracy theorizing. Did he jump, or was he pushed? If you had a job as the New York Times Middle East foreign correspondent, would you leave to edit a start-up newspaper? Just curious.

Case Closed?

Conventional wisdom is slowly congealing around the opinion that Israel's bombing strike last month did, in fact, target a Syrian nuclear facility. It bears mentioning that this story has been driven in large part by excellent reporting by the New York Times and The Washington Post. The photo on the left shows the suspected nuclear facility in August, before the bombing. After the bombings, satellite photos show that the 150 square-foot building had been completely bulldozed:

"But the images, federal and private analysts said Thursday, suggest that the Syrian authorities rushed to dismantle the facility after the strike, saying its removal could be interpreted as a tacit admission of guilt.

'It's a magic act -- here today, gone tomorrow,' said a senior intelligence official. 'It doesn't lower suspicions; it raises them. This was not the long-term decommissioning of a building, which can take a year. It was speedy. It's incredible that they could have gone to that effort to make something go away."

Of course, no amount of information is going to be enough to convince some people. After all, Syrian Ambassador Imad Moustapha says there wasn't!

Lebanese Army Fires On Israeli Aircraft

Good for them. It makes a mockery of those trying to enforce the UN Resolutions in Lebanon for Israel to constantly fly aircraft low over South Lebanon's cities. It is also massively damaging towards any hopes of peace between Lebanon and Israel. If Lebanon's government does nothing, they are alternatively portrayed as weak and irrelevant or pro-Israel lackeys. If the government fights back, they risk actually hitting something and igniting another conflict with Israel.

Regardless, those who insist on the government's sovereignty over all of Lebanon's territory can't merely criticize Hezbollah while ignoring the violations of the ham-handed neighbor to the south.

Connecting Some Of the Dots

This David Ignatius column is not important because it breaks any new ground on Lebanese politics; it does not. That is not a criticism -- after all, he is writing for a foreign audience. He mentions the plight of the hostages in the Phoenicia Hotel, a dependable and familiar embodiment of March 14's plight. He talks to Siniora, who says all the usual things. He seems to have a firm grasp of Lebanon's political terrain, and the stakes of the upcoming Presidential election.

To the extent that the average American think of Lebanon at all, I think that Ignatius reflects their beliefs: March 14 leaders have been assassinated because they dared to challenge Hezbollah and Syria. The opposition are proxy forces for Syria and Iran. Pro-Syrian newspapers blew America's gift of military aid out of proportion for its own propaganda purposes.

This set of beliefs, incidentally, is slowly graining wider international credibility. According to the New York Sun, a recent report by the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon links Syria to Fatah al-Islam. The Secretary-General seems to be escalating his rhetoric; in a speech yesterday, he also announced that he possessed evidence "that appears to corroborate the allegation that Syria facilitates the flow of weapons and fighters across the Syrian-Lebanese border."

All of this is well and good. But let's return to Ignatius's parting words:

"Lebanon needs a president; it needs political consensus. It needs an end to this enfeebling stalemate. Lebanon has been a hostage too long."

What do Ignatius and Ban imagine a "consensus" looks like? Where is the meeting point between these two sides? Our international observers prescribe "consensus," without taking the trouble to work out the pesky details. Lebanon's political leaders might be able to agree on the characteristics the next President should embody -- but they are unable to attach a name to their wish-list. Lebanon must have its next President in less than a month. Until we leave the realm of empty platitudes, forgive me if I remain pessimistic.

Rolled

Updating a previous post on Haaretz's allegations that Jumblatt and Israeli Defense Minister Barak met in Washington: David Schenker blasts the Israeli press for passing on rumors fashioned from Syrian propaganda outfits. Schenker is absolutely right. Outfits like Cham Press, which had previously run a story entitled "Walid Jumblatt: Donkey of Mukhtara and Dog of Feltman," shouldn't be read as anything other than an indicator of the Syrian regime's mood.

Just goes to prove that the freedom of the press is worthless if the press is ignorant.

Tit For Tat

So, after Walid Jumblatt accuses Hezbollah of being involved in assassinations within Lebanon, former MP Wiam Wahhab restores the polemical balance by accusing Saudi Arabia of killing Lebanese and Iraqis. An unnamed "Saudi senior official," according to Wahhab, "ordered the massacre of Lebanese, and we will not forget it."

Meanwhile, Hezbollah hits back at Jumblatt by calling his allegations "silly and ridiculous," so PSP MP Akram Chehayeb responds by attacking those "who changed their patriotic trends to Iran's, from Arabism to Persianism."

Just another day in Lebanese politics. But feel free to ignore these signs of impending chaos -- Lebanon's leaders assure us that it's just fine the Parliamentary session has been canceled twice, because the "political climate" is currently "optimistic."

Sometimes, Americans Are Stupid

W. Thomas Smith of the National Review struck a blow for freedom the other day:

"I snatched a Hezbollah flag -- the yellow banner with the green fist and rifle -- from one of the enemy's strongholds in Lebanon recently. And when I say stronghold, I literally mean a strong, heavily defended battle position where the Lebanese Army and police dare not enter, and I had to enter covertly."

It's hard to decide what is most grating about this post. Maybe it's his description of the dahiyeh as a "heavily defended battle position" that he entered "covertly." What were his James Bond-worthy techniques? Hopping into a taxi and saying "Haret Hreik?"

Mr. Smith's guide into the dahiyeh is a "former Christian militaman," who he seems to be on good terms with. Apparently, his problem isn't with unrepentant militiamen per se -- just militias that aren't fighting on our side. This is the type of person who shouldn't be allowed within a hundred miles of any decision affecting Lebanon.

Oy Vey

I missed this article when it first came out, but the New York Times published a great profile of Syrian Jews living in Brooklyn, New York last week. Presumably many of the "Syrian" Jews come from modern-day Lebanon, as many arrived during the beginning of the 20th century, when Syria and Lebanon were still one country.

The Syrian Jews have worked very hard to maintain the insular community they must have enjoyed in the Middle East in modern-day Brooklyn. They are governed by a strict edict prohibiting marriage to non-Jews, including converts to Judaism. Even most American Jews can't marry into the community. The Syrian Jews require proof, going back three generations and confirmed by an Orthodox rabbi, that their ancestors were married according to Orthodox law. Try asking your typical Manhattan hipster for that sort of documentation, and see what sort of reaction you get.

Anyway, the author captures the Middle Eastern nature of this religious community nicely -- and doesn't ignore the fact that there is something deeply enticing about the close-knit society:

"It's a magical place," he told me. "You come home from school and there are 10 women in the kitchen, your mother and aunts and cousins, cooking special Syrian delicacies. Every celebration is large, full of relatives. The etiquette is what they call fadal -- just come over, don't be formal. Very Middle Eastern. Very seductive and sensual."

For the clearing house of information on Lebanese Judaism, check out The Jews Of Lebanon.

Walid Jumblatt and Ehud Barak?

Haaretz forwards along, unquestioningly, a report published in Syrian mouthpiece Sham Press that Jumblatt is meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak in Washington DC. Barak is in Washington to discuss Middle East security, and the Iranian nuclear threat. According to the Syrian report, Jumblatt will ask Barak to use his Washington contacts to push for regime change in Syria.

The reasons why the Syrian regime would fabricate such a meeting are pretty obvious. Less clear is why Haaretz, a respectable paper that is certainly aware of the Syrian propaganda machine, would repeat the rumor without independent confirmation. Shmuel Rosner, Haaretz's Washington correspondent whose byline appears over the story, always appeared to be a relatively sharp political observer to my eyes. And the shared anti-Syrian position of Jumblatt and Barak could provide some common ground for the two leaders. I don't discount the possibility that Rosner heard unconfirmed rumors of a Jumblatt-Barak meeting, and decided to get the story in Haaretz by "reporting" on the Sham Press article.

$1,369.86

According to Faisal Akbar, a member of Al-Qaeda in the Levant, he was smuggled into Lebanon from Syria in late January 2005 with the express purpose of killing former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

"We paid 80,000 Syrian Lira to the smuggler in return to smuggling us over the border, whereby we crossed the Syrian side in around an hour. We began by descending then ascending the mountain then descending again. It should be known that we were transported on an old motorbike that was parked near the smuggler's home, and he would take each of us alone for a distance of 15 minutes then he would return and get the next one. He began by transporting Jamil then Abu Ades then Khalid and finally me, and he left the motorbike during the phase of ascending the mountain, where there was a small Syrian village, the name of which I can't remember, where the smuggler had acquaintances.

The nearest date that I can find an official conversion rate from Syrian pounds to US dollars is December 5, 2005. At that date, one dollar bought you 58.4 Syrian pounds. Assuming the conversion rate was approximately the same when Faisal Akbar crossed into Lebanon earler that year, him and his three compatriots paid $1369.86 to be smuggled into Lebanon. That actually strikes me as high, given that all the smuggler did was drive them up and down a mountain on his old motorbike.

Akbar then describes how they arrived in Beirut, went to their apartment in Dahiyeh, ordered some Kentucky Fried Chicken, and then planned Hariri's assassination. Akbar admitted to playing a role in Hariri's assassination in January 2006, but then retracted his confession. Whether or not he played a role in killing Hariri, the broad strokes of his description of the inner-workings of a jihadist organization may still be accurate.

Obviously, it is no coincidence that Akbar's confession appears in the opposition-aligned Al-Akhbar. In the wake of Nahr al-Bared and with the Presidential elections looming, it serves the opposition's narrative to blame Hariri's murder on a Sunni Islamist who was operating below the radar of the Syrian regime. Check out Nibras Kazimi's blog for his English translation of the entire testimony.

Come Again?

From USA Today:

The military in Lebanon has long been weak, numbering 56,000 personnel, with about 220 battle tanks, no effective air power and no air defense system. Hezbollah guerrillas are widely considered a stronger, more experienced force, and they were able to fight Lebanon's military to a standstill last year.(emphasis mine)

Good to know that the American press thinks that civil war broke out in Lebanon last year...

The Lebanese Army's Bizarre "Creed"

The United States is apparently trying to build bridges with the Lebanese Army. But why? Well, for starters, Nahr al-Bared proved that the army was functional, non-sectarian, and immensely popular. If such a thing as a stock market for political institutions existed, the value of the Lebanese Army would be skyrocketing. By building the Lebanese Army up, to the tune of $270 million this year alone, the Americans also hope that it will emerge into an effective fighting force which can threaten Hezbollah's hegemony over South Lebanon.

Finally, there is the fear of that vestigial Syrian influences within the Army could be used against the government. Syrian troops may have left Lebanon, but that doesn't mean their puppets in the Army vanished into the wind. If you have a free moment and an abnormally strong stomach for flowery rhetoric, check out the Lebanese Army's official "creed." It is one of those anachronistic holdovers from the Syrian occupation, and it is probably no coincidence that the Lebanese Army is one of the institutions where it survives.

Take section 1.5: "The special and brotherly relationship between Lebanon and Syria"

Lebanon and Syria have common historical links that sprout from nationalistic and geographical considerations and from the common interests of the two countries, especially in their confrontation with the Israeli enemy. The relationships of cooperation and collaboration between the two countries had had, after conceding to the Taïf Accord, positive results for both countries.

Gag me. After giving a big hug to the Syrians, the creed clearly defines Israel as the enemy in the next session.

Lebanon is facing many threats to its structure and to the pillars of its existence, especially the Zionist threat, as Israel has been ever since its foundation, the source of wars and tragedies that Lebanon and the Arab countries have suffered a lot from for about half a century . The horizons of real peace are still unseen due to the racist nature of the Israeli entity. Israel is the only member of the United Nations that has not yet drawn its final borders . This goes back to its expantionist avarice and to the blending of its political, military, and social concepts with its religious concepts that are based on the myth of the "Promised Land."

It's interesting that the word "avarice" appears four times in the section on Israel, a pretty overt allusion to the typical anti-Semitic stereotype of greedy, covetous Jews. Regardless, what follows the above quote is a lengthy exposition on a Zionist document written in 1919, which reads as if some freshman college student hacked into the Army's website and decided to regurgitate his homework from the night before. Someone needs to thank the Army for their valuable political insights, and then gently remind them that Lebanon's elected leaders get to decide who is a friend, and who is an enemy.

None of this is to say that everyone takes the "creed" seriously. Obviously, there is a wide range of opinion within the Army. But I'm sure American policymakers are concerned with burying this particular strand of pro-Syrian, anti-Israeli sentiment for good, especially in such a vital institution.

Talking To Al Qaeda In Lebanon

Speaking of Nibras Kazimi, I just came across his blog. He's currently translating a marathon interview with Faisal Akbar published in Al-Akhbar last week. Akbar was an Al Qaeda militant arrested in Beirut who first admitted to being part of the Hariri assassination, and later recanted. While the first part of the interview does not break any new ground regarding Lebanese political developments, it is a rare look into the organizational structure of a movement that generally remains out of the public eye. For example:

"Usually, the mujaheddin from Lebanon are received after they have been vouched for from persons who are already members in the group, and they are activists who have already pledged allegiance, and they are trustworthy. After someone arrives from Lebanon, he is received in Syria, and is taken to a place that we call a 'madhafeh' [guest house], without letting him know the route or address, and the procedures are called 'secure transfer.' Then this person usually undergoes a security seminar...During this time, he pledges allegiance to the Emir, which binds him to working with the group. I should add that it is the right of a mujahid to stipulate during his pledge of allegiance whether he would be a fighter or a suicide bomber, or to stipulate that he is only to fight the Americans, or to set any conditions that the mujahid may want.

Outside The Box

You would think that, five days from the Parliamentary session which will supposedly elect Lebanon's next President, Beirut would be abuzz with news. You would be wrong. There is not so much breaking news as one static reality: the opposing forces are happy to draw the process out, waiting for the other side to blink. There is no surer sign of this than Walid Jumblatt's current presence in Washington D.C. If there was any chance that a deal was going to be cut in the next few days, you can bet that he would be in Beirut.

A few pundits and political has-beens have tried to fill the dead air with solutions that are a little, uh, unconventional. While I am all for thinking outside of the box, some of these ideas remind us why we have a "box" in the first place. Take Salim Hoss's recent suggestion that the political leaders set up an unofficial ballot box, where the MPs would vote for one of four "neutral" candidates. With everyone on the same page, they could then proceed to Parliament and elect the candidate with the most votes. There are enough objections to this scheme to make one wonder whether Hoss understands the concept of democracy. Most perniciously, March 14 has come too far and sacrificed too much to accept a "neutral" President, whatever that means.

More intellectually stimulating is Nibras Kazimi's recommendation that Lebanon just scrap this whole Presidential election entirely. It's more trouble than it's worth, you see. Any President is going to disrupt the balance between March 14 and March 8, he says, and result in blood in the streets. Much better to maintain the standard dysfunction, letting Presidential perogatives devolve to PM Siniora. Parliament can draw up a new electoral law, and everyone else can hold their breath for the next election cycle. The problem is that Kazimi seems to be unaware that President Lahoud has stated that he will tear up Taif and refuse to pass power to the Siniora government in the event of a Presidential vacuum. Tranferring Presidential perogatives to the Siniora government, which the opposition has spent the past year trying to topple, holds a greater risk of violence than electing a strong March 14 President.

Aoun Wobbly Watch, Second Edition

After Ibrahim Kenaan refused to refer to Hezbollah as an "ally" a week ago, Free Patriotic Movement MP Ghassan Mkhaiber takes to the press to declare that the FPM is "deeply rooted in the March 14 spirit." If Aoun were to become President, Mkhaiber declared, [he] would not allow the return of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon."

That sounds like the statement of a party which has finally realized that General Aoun is not going to be the Presidential candidate of Hezbollah or Syria. The most likely explanation for Mkhaiber and Kenaan's remarks is not that they are laying the groundwork for an endorsement of Boutros Harb or Nassib Lahoud, but that they are trying to build March 14 support for Aoun's Presidential bid. If November 24 approaches without a Presidential deal, the game plan probably goes, March 14 will have to choose between a President elected with an absolute majority, a wishy-washy "consensus" candidate -- or General Aoun. If Aoun can build some bridges in the next month, the thinking goes, he just may be able to pull a rabbit out of his hat.

But I don't think it's going to happen. Aoun may have been able to endear himself to March 14 a year ago -- maybe even six months ago. But now, he is too tightly linked with the opposition protests. By supporting him, March 14 would be conceding surrender in the year-long deadlock. Furthermore, the past year has made pro-government forces rightly skeptical about Aoun's volatility, and his judgment. That doesn't mean the FPM's recent change of heart is politically irrelevant. If the FPM is forced to choose between Michel Sleiman or Nassib Lahoud for the Presidency, they may go with the March 14 candidate over the "consensus" option.

I conducted an interview (poorly) with Mkhaiber a few weeks ago, and made the mistake of referring to him as an Aounist. He quickly corrected me, arguing that though he was affiliated with Aoun's Parliamentary bloc, he is not a member of the FPM. Mkhaiber obviously resented the implication that he was blindly loyal to the decisions of the General. After I had asked my questions, he said something to the effect of: "I hope you are not one of those foreign journalists who describes the opposition as 'pro-Syrian' or 'Hezbollah-led'." Whatever our disagreements, I do believe that his anti-Syrian rhetoric is sincere.

A Last Stand

Blacksmith Jade links to this wonderfully written and horribly formatted account, by Walid Phares, of the Lebanese Army's last stand against Syrian troops on October 13, 1990. It is quite a story, and one that I know very little about. In Phares's account, the heroes are the young officers and soldiers who continued to resist the Syrians, even after General Aoun had ordered them to surrender:

"Until 8 AM, not one single front was pierced despite the massive bombardment. At 8:10 AM the Lebanese state radio aired a brief statement by Prime Minister Michel Aoun. He -stunningly- gave the orders to his army to surrender to the Syrians. Practically he asked them to follow the Syrian appointed commander of the surrogate Lebanese Army, none else than General Emile Lahoud, who will be gratified eight years later by being selected as the pro-Syrian President of Lebanon. A page in Lebanon's history has turned by 8:30 AM that day. Not yet.

For in the following eight hours a battle will ensue between the headless Lebanese Army and the invading forces: A battle which will be led by anonymous officers who refused to surrender to a regime sponsoring terror and about to conquer another country member of the United Nations.

Phares contends that Hezbollah forces took part in the final assault on the last enclave of Lebanon not under Syrian occupation -- a statement rejected by at least one of Blacksmith Jade's commenters. This isn't a subject I'm familiar with, so if anyone has any information supporting either side of the debate I'd be interested to hear it.

Crossing Borders, Spreading Rumors

Conventional wisdom is hardening around two conclusions regarding a couple of unresolved stories in the ongoing drama that is Middle East politics.

Drama #1: The definitive article on Israel's strike on a military base in Northern Syria is this one, published in the New York Times. It concludes that the attack was "directed against a site that Israeli and American intelligence analysts judged was a partly constructed nuclear reactor, apparently modeled on one North Korea has used to create its stockpile of nuclear weapons fuel."

The piece suggests that Sec. State Rice and Sec. Defense Gates were opposed to the raid, while Vice President Cheney was gung-ho (shocking). In any case, Israel was determined to go along with the strike without American blessing -- in order "re-establish the credibility of our deterrent power," lost after the July War in Lebanon. It also provides a theory about why the Israelis, Americans, and Syrians refuse to discuss the strike. The Syrians don't want the world to know that they were developing nuclear technology, or that they are unable to protect it. And the Americans are currently in negotiations with the North Koreans to get them to give up their nuclear capabilities, and do not want to endanger the negotiations by providing evidence that they had previously sold their knowledge to Syria.

Drama #2: The Western press has picked up on an Asharq al-Awsat report that the two Israeli soldiers captured in Lebanon -- the event which sparked the July War -- currently reside in Iran. Or, at least, that is where their remains reside -- an Israeli military report of the capture site argued that there was a "high likelihood" that the soldiers were dead.

The Syrian Power Struggle

"The afternoon is the worst time for a serious power outage - especially in the middle of a burning hot summer. The hours between one and four or five transform one from a keen-sensed poet into a crazed murderer... You curse your mother and your father who brought you into Syria."

I am a big fan of the international tribunal, but I have always been skeptical of the contention that it poses an existential threat to the Syrian regime. I'm sorry, but I just don't see the "international community" dragging Bashar al-Assad off to the Hague in handcuffs. The greater risk to the Assad regime is popular discontent at living in a poverty-stricken, stagnant country. MEMRI reports on rising resentment caused by the blackouts that swept across Syria this summer. In early August, a hacker broke into the Electricity Ministry's website, and left the message: "I thank all the Electricity Ministry employees, and particularly the [electricity] minister, who so far has offered no solution and has abandoned the country and the people who gave him his job. I also express my gratitude for the tremendous effort of all those in charge of maintenance in the Electricity Ministry - an effort that demonstrates their inability to bear the responsibility and to hold onto their lofty positions. How long will we remain backward? How long?"

Even the normally docile Syrian press got into the act. The Syrian daily Al-Watan wrote, in its daily editorial:

"What is the use of all members of the government stressing the 'improvement' in the citizen's [standard of] living? What is the use of threats, promises, and ultimatums [for solving the crisis] when they are only slogans? The Syrian citizen raises these questions every day, every hour, in an attempt to obtain an explanation of what is going on. Water comes from Allah, but electricity is the government's responsibility... What are the investor, the tourist, and the immigrant told? Are they told that the planning is poor, and that the cause of the crisis is the corruption and neglect? Or are we to reiterate the words of the government and of the electricity minister, that the crisis is temporary and it will be overcome within a short time?"

"All politics is local," said an American politician. It is a principle to live by, even in Syria.

Saad Speaks

In what is the journalistic equivalent of finding a four-leaf clover, Newsweek got Saad Hariri to sit down for an interview while he was in New York City. None of his answers should surprise dedicated Lebanon-watchers -- his entire purpose seems to be to provide the Cliff's Notes verson of Lebanon's political crisis for a American and European audience. There was an interesting moment, however, when the Newsweek journalist pressed Hariri on his desire to ascend to the Prime Ministership. Hariri got rather cagey:

Have you decided that it is your duty to take your father's position?

I am the majority leader in the parliament. So I have to assume my responsibilities.

Does that mean that you are going to [try to become prime minister]?

It means I will assume my responsibility as a majority leader. First and most important is [to hold] the presidential election. After that, everything is going to be easier to resolve. If you are asking me if I want to be prime minister or not, I am not saying that I don't want to be and I am not saying that I want to be.

If my opinion counts for anything (and it doesn't), Hariri will be ready for the Prime Ministership when he's giving interviews like this regularly -- with Lebanese journalists of all political stripes -- and knocking them out of the park. Until then, Siniora has proven himself to be a competent administrator, though not a leader that sets the world on fire, and he provides a valuable buffer between the government's actions and the Future Movement leader. There's no reason to disrupt a useful relationship, for the time being.

"A Dilettante On An Expense Account"

That's Michael Young's description of New York Times reporter Thanassis Cambanis, in a vicious and entirely deserved takedown. Ouch. Young then moves on to the larger question of the persistent charge of "fascism" in the Lebanese Christian community:

"Yet most Lebanese Christians seemed to have no place amid this virtuous advocacy [of Arab nationalism]. The Christians seemed to be stubbornly resisting the Middle East's future. By proclaiming their communal rights, they were undermining an Arab nationalist ideology that promised to banish ancient communal identities; by arming against the Palestinians during the early 1970s, they were only further harming the Arab world's acknowledged victims; by being so different than those around them, they were bucking the trend, ruining the good vibes that Westerners dedicated to the Arab world's glorious destiny were so keen to impose. Lebanese Christians were a foreign body disrupting regional harmony, a fifth column, a reminder of how the colonial West had wanted Arabs to be. Therefore, it was perfectly reasonable to describe them alone as having fascist tendencies.

Read the whole thing. Also, check out Young's classic response to Juan Cole, who accused the Phalange of being fascist. Key line: "the Christian militias, like their wartime foes, always were first and foremost sectarian." Quite right. Not particularly comforting, but quite right.

Whither Aoun?

Abu Kais asks a sharp question: is the Aoun - Hezbollah relationship on the rocks? This isn't the first time that March 14-sympathetic Lebanon-watchers have predicted the demise of this alliance, but there are better reasons to think the relationship is on the rocks than before. It's becoming increasingly obvious that Hezbollah isn't going to push too hard, or at all, for an Aoun Presidency. If Aoun doesn't even get Shia support for his Presidential campaign, it is hard to see what he is getting in return for being Hezbollah's Christian cover.

A few hints may be leaking out. The secretary of the FPM's Parliamentary Bloc, MP Ibrahim Kanaan, raised the possibility of the FPM voting in a Parliamentary session to elect the President even if a consensus candidate has not been reached. The FPM may not be able to push Aoun into the Presidency, but they could ensure the two-thirds quorum in Parliament necessary for March 14 to elect a President by themselves. In this scenario, the FPM would likely show up and vote for Aoun -- fully aware that they are going to get outvoted by March 14.

Obviously, this is the worst of all worlds for Hezbollah -- March 14 gets their President in a way that cannot be attacked as unconstitutional. And Kanaan didn't do anything to assuage their concerns by saying that Hezbollah "is not an ally," but merely "a partner in the homeland. We are all partners in the homeland."

Aoun and Franjieh's meeting at Bkirke today, with Patriarch Sfeir, was also called off for unknown reasons. Could the Patriarch have hinted that Aoun's alliance with Hezbollah no longer holds any benefits for the nation as a whole, or even Aoun individually? Aoun is a proud man, and there is still no reason for him to abandon Hezbollah without assurances that he can find another alliance. However, given his current position, March 14 may be able to buy his support for fifty cents on the dollar. Will the government make a deal?

The Anatomy Of Outrage

The shiny building to your right is the Apple store in midtown Manhattan, New York City, contructed in May 2006. The building beneath it is the Kabaa, the holiest shrine in Islam in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, constructed in its present form around the late seventh century.

In October 2006, an Islamist website posted an outraged message that the Apple store was deliberately meant to resemble the Kabaa, and constituted a direct provocation to Muslims. The website alleged that the Apple store would be open 24 hours a day, like the Kabaa, and would sell alcoholic beverages (both untrue statements, but the alcoholic beverage idea is one Apple could take under consideration).

The story gestated for a year, before popping up last week in Kashmir, Pakistan of all places. "Hundreds of students of the local Degree College took out a protest march through the streets of Baramulla town, chanting anti-American and pro-Islam slogans," reads the Islamic Republic News Agency article. "The students said that building a wine-shop or a bar like the Kaaba amounted to the desecration of the holy sites of Islam."

So it goes, in parts of the world. Will this be the next "Danish cartoon" scandal, or do we get a few more months off? (Hat Tip: The Spine, and MacDailyNews for the picture)

Syria Walks The Line

Kudos to Damascus-based reporter Hugh Naylor for publishing this report on Syria's support for the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. This charge is thrown around Washington with some frequency, but it's impressive that Naylor was able to get Syrians to substantiate his claims. He uncovered information about a conference among Iraqi insurgent groups, with the goal of coordinating efforts against the US military, at a resort outside Damascus. He also quotes a former Syrian Minister of Information comparing the Iraqi insurgency to George Washington fighting to British.

What is clear is that Syria is walking a thin line in Iraq. Syria's role in organizing the insurgency risks bringing down the wrath of the United States. It also endangers Syria's alliance with Iran, which supports the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq and does not take kindly to attacks on the government by ancien regime Sunnis. Syria has a lot of experience destabilizing neighboring countries. They're going to need all of it.

This Could Be Heaven, Or This Could Be Hell

Did I just write an entire article on the MPs living in the Phoenicia, without once referencing The Eagles' "Hotel California?" I'm slipping. Here is the (apt) final verse, posted now by way of atonement:

Last thing I remember, I was
Running for the door.
I had to find the passage back
To the place I was before.

"Relax," said the night man,
"We are programmed to receive.
You can check out any time you like,
But you can never leave."

More seriously, I don't want to give the impression that we should all be lamenting the plight of the poor March 14 MPs, permanent guests in one of Beirut's most opulent hotels. They'll get along just fine. Their imprisonment is important because it reflects the constant threat to their lives, and because their isolation from everyday life risks creating a bunker mentality.

I asked Mohammed Qabbani (Sunni, Future Movement) and Akram Chehayeb (Druze, PSP) what needed to be done to resolve the security crisis, and I thought their answers were instructive about the political divide within March 14. Kabbani answered, "It depends on whether we elect a President by consensus or not. If we elect a President by consensus, things will be better."

In contrast, Chehayeb said, "It does not matter how the President is elected. Syria will try to kill us regardless." Obviously, Chehayeb's perspective has no use for a "compromise" President -- what common ground can you have with your murderer? Time will tell if this division remains theoretical, or grows to challenge the Sunni - Druze alliance.

Sign of the Times

One last post before I, hopefully, can free myself from cataloguing the faults of the New York Times. Somehow I missed the contention in the first sentence of the aforementioned atrocious article: "the country's once-dominant Christian community feels under siege and has begun re-establishing militias, training in the hills and stockpiling weapons."

This is quite an accusation, and you would expect the Times to do some original reporting to back it up. You would be disappointed. All the author, Thanassis Cambanis, mentions is a September cabinet session, and the already-publicized fact that the ISF arrested some Aounists for weapons training. This is not the same as the "Christian community" re-establishing their militias. There is only evidence of the FPM arming its members -- neither the Phalange or the LF have been accused of anything.

Gee, isn't it strange that the Aounists -- the Christians, according to the Times, who want to "accept their minority status and get along with the Muslim majority" -- are also the ones training for the next war? A better editor could have pointed this out to Cambanis, in the process of sending him back to the drawing board.

Finally, as Mustapha pointed out earlier, it's impossible to write about the reason that there is pressure on any Lebanese party to rearm without mentioning the one faction that never disarmed in the first place: Hezbollah. The Christian factions are not only eyeing each other nervously, they are worried about the militia that has a fifteen-year head start, foreign support, and actual battle-hardened troops. This is yet another point that would be too much to ask the New York Times to point out.

The Greater Lebanon News Service

It is hard, if not impossible, to talk about Lebanese politics without describing what is going on in the broader Western and Arab worlds. So here's a rundown of the important news and commentary, both from within Lebanon and without, during the past few days.

• Nicholas Blanford remembers his meeting with recently-murdered Islamist preacher/Syrian regime agent Abu al-Qaqa. Qaqa was an interesting hybrid -- someone who could channel Islamist energy in Aleppo to causes that aided the Syrian regime. And this should put an end to the arguments that the "secular" Alawite regime could never make common cause with Islamists, right? Glad that's taken care of.

• Seymour Hersh publishes rings the alarm bells over Bush's plan to invade Iran. I can't speak for the Bush Administration, but in my experience this is a scheme that anti-war liberals like to talk about more than pro-war hawks. Most hawks don't harbor any love for the Iranian regime, but at the same time realize that the United States has its hands full in Iraq and can't afford to open up another front in Iran.

  Nevertheless, Hersh can't get enough of this story because it allows him to paint the Bush Administration as reckless -- despite the fact that it has yet to launch a single attack on Iranian forces, in spite of his continuous warnings. Maybe Saad Hariri can provide a brigade of Islamists to help the United States Army occupy Tehran.

• I like Jeha's take on the friends behind some of Lebanon's Presidential candidates. Like me, he seems a bit unsure on where Syria's loyalties lie. Is Boutros Harb really an option? Apparently, he's close to Nabih Berri. Army commander Michel Sleiman is probably the most likely "Syrian candidate," but it's not like he's coming out and screaming that fact from the rooftops. On a similar note: who is the "American candidate?" No, Walid Jumblatt hasn't thrown his name in the ring.

  Scanning the list of potential names, one happy fact does present itself: Lebanon is almost certain to have a better President than Emile Lahoud. OK, the cynics among you may note that there was nowhere to go but up. And, of course, there is still a wide difference among the candidates in their commitment to Lebanese sovereignty, and spreading the control of the state across all parts of the country. But March 14 is going to find itself on better terms with Lebanon's President come late November, and it should start thinking now about how to exploit that fact.

• There was an update earlier this week about the Air Strike That Dares Not Speak Its Name -- namely, last month's Israeli attack on a northern Syria military facility that none of the parties involved wanted to speak about. Bashar al-Assad told the BBC that the Israeli planes hit an "unused military building," an excuse which doesn't even sound like anybody put a great deal of effort into formulating. Funny, considering that almost a month passed between the actual strike and this explanation. Syrian officials had previously only said that Israeli plans had entered Syrian airspace, came under fire from Syrian anti-air guns, and fled back to Occupied Palestine.

  Aviation Week has one explanation for how the Israeli jets could have entered Syrian territory undetected. Apparently, a U.S.-developed "Suter" network attack system can invade enemy sensors, allowing a country to see what the sensors see and even manipulate them so that attacking aircraft can't be seen. I have precisely no idea if that's what happens, but it does jibe with reports in the Kuwaiti press that US jets provided air cover for the Israeli attacks.

This Again?

From today's New York Times:

"The struggle is over who gets to be the next president, a post reserved for a Christian under Lebanon's Constitution, and which must be filled by the end of November. But the larger question -- one that is prompting rival Christian factions to threaten war -- is whether Lebanese Christians must accept their minority status and get along with the Muslim majority (the choice of the popular Gen. Michel Aoun) or whether Christians should insist on special privileges no matter what their share of the population (the position of veteran civil war factions like the Phalange and the Lebanese Forces).

Contrary to some available evidence, I am perfectly well aware that there are other issues affecting Lebanon than the New York Times's crappy coverage of the country. That said, this is too blatant to avoid mentioning. What are the "special privileges" that the Phalange and the Lebanese Forces desire, that the Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement rejects? Why are only the Phalange and LF referred to as "veteran civil war factions," and not Aoun -- who also played a major role in the later years of the civil war?

In fact, one could read this whole article and come away with the impression that it is only Aoun who is so openminded as to have Muslim allies. Are the March 14 Sunnis chopped liver? There is a nice quote from Antoine Franjieh, who runs the Marada youth movement, describing how the Hezbollah-allied Christians are "overcom[ing] their own deeply entrenched prejudice against Muslims." But don't expect the "veteran civil war factions" to receive the same praise.

Blind Opposition

Hezbollah bigwig Naim Qassem announced that his party would agree to any President "if this one is elected by the two-thirds parliamentary quorum specified in the Constitution." How nice of him. It's not true, of course, but it certainly makes Qassem seem magnanimous. That, after all, was the point.

Sticking to the necessity of a two-thirds quorum to elect a President is a procedural stance, not a position on the identity of Lebanon's next President. It is the Hezbollah-led boycott of the Parliament that prevents a two-thirds quorum. If anyone elected by a two-thirds quorum is acceptable, this is a problem that Naim Qassem and the Hezbollah deputies could solve by simply walking to Nejmeh Square. But we shouldn't expect this blessed event to happen any time soon; Hezbollah is kicking and screaming about their procedural position to hide the fact that they are actually quite ambivalent about the current slew of Presidential candidates.

It is worth remembering why we are having a Presidential election now in the first place. Syria pushed for an extension of President Emile Lahoud's term in 2004 precisely because there were no other Christian leaders of any stature who could be counted on to represent their interests. That has not changed in the past three years. Given that Syria and Hezbollah want essentially the same thing out of Lebanon's next President -- someone who will maintain close ties with Syria and do nothing to disrupt Hezbollah's military activities -- it is hard to see who that figure would be, and easy to see Hezbollah's difficulty in committing to any specific candidate.

Given how Hezbollah MPs have been vacillating over whether Aoun is their candidate, people are right to ask who their real candidate is. But the real question may be: do they want anyone at all?

Some Say The World Will End In Fire...

I have no great insider knowledge on the cause of yesterday's fires, so I will have to rely on my common sense -- which, apparently, is more than some people can say. Common sense says that 200 forest fires, more damaging than all fires in the past decade combined, does not break out by accident. Especially when the fires are spread out over large swaths of the country, and when many of them break out during the evening or night.

The head of the Lebanese Civil Defense, Brigadier-General Darweesh Hobeika, thinks the fires were set "by people trying to obtain charcoal as a cheaper substitute for fuel." But common sense argues against a nationally coordinated scheme by environmentally unfriendly, charcoal-seeking Lebanese farmers. What are the odds that these Lebanese would all decide independently that yesterday was the day to burn the forest? If this was set by people looking for a source of fuel, we could have expected to see these 200 fires set over the course of the summer.

That said -- if this is a political message, it is an exceptionally poor way to send it. The whole point of political violence is to dissuade others from following in the footsteps of those affected. When Antoine Ghanem was killed, the message was clear: stick out your neck out too far for March 14, and this is what happens. Since it is unclear what the Lebanese are being punished for -- some of the fires were even in the eastern Bekaa, not exactly a bastion of pro-government support -- it is hard to see how these fires will change anybody's behavior.

More questions than answers, I know. But what else is new?

Thoughts On Robert Fisk

I am constantly impressed by Lebanon's ability to turn regular political divisions upside-down. Where else in the world could a lefty, pro-Palestinian, anti-US and UK (governments) journalist like Robert Fisk make common cause with the Bush Administration, or Samir Geagea? Or, for that matter, me.

Fisk made his reputation as a journalist during the Lebanese civil war. I do not think I am breaking new ground by saying that he has lost a step since then. If you caught him in a moment of honesty, he might even admit it too. Maybe Lebanon is also at fault; the stories during the civil war were doubtlessly larger and more glamorous, at least for a foreign audience, than peacetime journalism. But I do not think that is the full story. One of the first journalists to Sabra Shatila in the 1980s, three interviews with Osama Bin Laden in the 1990s -- and this decade, articles about a Beirut dinner party.

But how rare it is to have something to lose. There are still flashes of brilliance, and a deeper understanding of how Lebanon works than almost all English-language Beirut-based writers. When I read most of the foreign press, I rarely recognize the country I live in. Fisk may no longer do the legwork to break the next big story, but he captures the mood of Lebanon better than pretty much any foreign correspondent. That, at least, is something.

What Is Saad Doing?

Like Mustapha, I'm not sure what purpose of Saad Hariri's meeting this week with President Bush serves. I'm obviously in favor of an alliance between the United States and March 14, so I don't have any objections to Saad cutting deals with the Great Satan. The problem with this meeting, at this time, is that it won't develop the positive aspects of March 14's alliance with the United States at all, while doing a considerable amount to illuminate the problematic parts of the alliance.

At the end of the meeting, President Bush will inevitably make some comment about how Hariri represents the forces in Lebanon supporting democracy and sovereignty. Great, but that's no different from what US diplomats have been saying for the past two years. Those who are still unconvinced by this rhetoric aren't going to change their positions because Bush said it again. We already know that the Bush Administration has put all its chips behind March 14. Those attracted by either American principles or American power are already in Hariri's camp.

But there are plenty of negatives to Saad's visit. It is bound to annoy the anti-American Shia parties in the opposition, and could even hurt the Future Movement's attempts to consolidate its strength among anti-American portions of the Sunni community. I have no problem antagonizing March 8 if there is something tangible to gain in return, but a cardinal rule of politics is that you don't piss people off unless you have a good reason. The meeting gives additional ammunition to Syrian and Iranian mouthpieces. With Lebanon in the middle of a Presidential election, it allows Saad to be painted as an American puppet.

At the end of the day, you have to ask: what about this meeting couldn't be accomplished with a telephone conversation?