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July 2007 Archives
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July 26, 2007
You Will Not Read This Story Anywhere Else
One has to assume that the Hariri investigation has been covered to death, and there's not a great deal of original things to say about it. Well, here's one of those few remaining original things -- above-ground nuclear weapons-testing conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s and '60s may be helping investigators learn more about the identity of the suicide bomber responsible for Hariri's death.
Yup, you read that right. You see, the 8th Brammertz Commission report stated that they had conducted "orthodontic" analyses of the suicide bomber. In layman's terms, they had one of his teeth.
Now here's where it gets cool. Before 1955, when the first above-ground nuclear test was conducted, the amount of radioactive carbon-14, commonly known as radiocarbon, in the air was relatively stable. Nuclear weapons tests over the next decade or so caused the amount of atmospheric radiocarbon to skyrocket. The radiocarbon quickly spread evenly over the atmosphere.
The radiocarbon enters plants through photosynthesis, and then enters humans' bodies through an individual's consumption of plants, or animals that have eaten the plants. Before the age of 12, when the enamel on a person's teeth formed, the radiocarbon then gets lodged in the teeth. The enamel then forms over it, locking the radiocarbon in.
I know that it seems that we've left the Hariri investigation -- and Lebanese politics in general -- far behind. But here's where it connects: scientists can compare the amount of radiocarbon in a tooth with the measured amount of atmospheric radiocarbon in certain years. That way, they can pinpoint the age of the tooth's owner with impressive accuracy. This could be how the Brammertz Commission determined that the suicide bomber was between 20 and 25 years old.
So it's not the most important aspect of the Hariri investigation -- but it may be the coolest. A National Geographic article on this scientific technique can be found here. And if this sort of thing interests you, read a larger article I wrote titled CSI: Beirut.
July 23, 2007
The Stupidest Fatwas
The fatwas against the polio vaccine, Pokemon, or Salman Rushdie -- which is the stupidest? Foreign Policy has the answer. There was cross-religious agreement on the Pokemon one; the Catholic Church in Mexico called them "demonic." I think it's something about the eyes...
July 22, 2007
Fair and Balanced
One of the English language's landmark 20th century essays is Orwell's "Politics and the English Language," written in 1946. If you're having a lazy Sunday, read it in full here. It was written in the aftermath of World War II, with all of the skepticism of the ultimate triumph of order and liberty that would have been requisite at the time. Let me quote the final paragraph:
"I have not here been considering the literary use of language, but merely language as an instrument for expressing and not for concealing or preventing thought. Stuart Chase and others have come near to claiming that all abstract words are meaningless, and have used this as a pretext for advocating a kind of political quietism. Since you don't know what Fascism is, how can you struggle against Fascism? One need not swallow such absurdities as this, but one ought to recognize that the present political chaos is connected with the decay of language, and that one can probably bring about some improvement by starting at the verbal end. If you simplify your English, you are freed from the worst follies of orthodoxy. You cannot speak any of the necessary dialects, and when you make a stupid remark its stupidity will be obvious, even to yourself. Political language -- and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists -- is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind. One cannot change this all in a moment, but one can at least change one's own habits, and from time to time one can even, if one jeers loudly enough, send some worn-out and useless phrase -- some jackboot, Achilles' heel, hotbed, melting pot, acid test, veritable inferno, or other lump of verbal refuse -- into the dustbin, where it belongs."
And where does that leave us, now living in 21st century Beirut? Why, with the launch of General Michel Aoun's OTV station, of course. Here is how Dima Sadeq, an OTV news presenter, described the station's political tilt:
"Even if we reflect the opposition's point of view, this will be done objectively," she added.
I don't really think I need to add anything else.
July 19, 2007
Star Pupil
From a New York Times article on Shiite political leader Moqtada al-Sadr:
"Mr. Sadr has been working tirelessly to build support at the grass-roots level, opening storefront offices across Baghdad and southern Iraq that dispense services that are not being provided by the government. In this he seems to be following the model established by Hezbollah, the radical Lebanese Shiite group, as well as Hamas in Gaza, with entwined social and military wings that serve as a parallel government.
Mr. Sadr’s offices are accessible storefronts that dispense a little bit of everything: food, money, clothes, medicine and information. From just one office in Baghdad and one in Najaf in 2003, the Sadr operation has ballooned. It now has full-service offices in most provinces and nine in Baghdad, as well as several additional storefront centers. In some neighborhoods, the militiamen come around once a month to charge a nominal fee — about 5,000 Iraqi dinars, or $4 — for protection. In others, they control the fuel supply, and in some, where sectarian killings have gone on, they control the real estate market for empty houses."
It's a good piece, and Sadr comes off as a canny politician. Of course, the million-dollar question is whether there is a military Hizbullah - Sadr connection on the ground in Iraq. But we may have to wait for the history books to answer that one.
July 18, 2007
Terror In the United States
Let me leapfrog on Abu Kais's thoughts on the terror threat in the United States with a nifty graphic, from the always handy Foreign Policy blog. Abu Kais reports on a US National Intelligence report stating that Hizbullah has sleeper cells in the United States. While it does not surprise me to learn that Hizbullah has its sympathizers in America, I would be shocked if Hizbullah was so stupid as to actually carry out terrorist attacks on US soil. For the game to reach that state, America would probably have to be engaged directly in a Lebanese ground war.
When it comes to terror in the United States, more interesting is the claim by the Bush Administration and conservative intelligentsia that the President has prevented attacks on American soil after 9/11. This graph lends credence to this claim -- though the price has been an explosion, so to speak, of terror attacks primarily in the Middle East. Most of those attacks are related to the continuing violence in Iraq.
The point is that terrorists are currently concerned mainly with fighting America's Middle Eastern allies abroad. September 11th did not mark the beginning of a wave of terror on the United States directly, but a sustained attack on United States interests, allies, and -- yes-- principles abroad. Even if we exclude the Middle East, terror attacks worldwide rose after September 11th: in 2001, there were 1,223 attacks outside of the Middle East; in 2006, there were 2,113.
After its allies have been defeated or emasculated, it is logical to think that America's enemies would begin to attack America directly. But let's hope it never comes to that.
July 17, 2007
Cognitive Dissonance
I've read the arguments for an interim president a few times now, and each time I end up more confused than in disagreement. The argument generally begins with a fairly accurate description of Lebanon's problems -- and then veers off into a "solution" which does nothing to address those problems. The only affect of an interim president, as I see it, would be to decrease the already low probability of Lebanon ever electing a President based on its constitutional requirements and not the exigencies of the day.
I am not even sure that a two-year President would do anything to lower the tensions between March 8th and March 14th. Would either faction covet the Presidency less if it was announced that the President would only sit for two years? Given this "tweak" of the constitution, and the extension of Lahoud's term, wouldn't it be a fair bet from any Presidential aspirant that their term, too, could be extended? The role of the interim President would be the "drafting of a new and broadly approved electoral law," and the reform of Taif. Why a true, six-year President couldn't do this remains unclear.
The disconnect lies in fundamentally different explanations for Lebanon's problems. The technocratic, feel-good answer for Lebanon's political crisis is to point to its laws and constitutional structure. If we just tweak Taif and reform the electoral law, these people say, we'll have a functioning government and the Lebanese will get along. They are counting on an interim President to reform the system, and then get out of the way for the new order to assert itself.
You'll find no argument here that Lebanon's electoral law is perfect. It isn't. But its flaws are also not the reason for Lebanon's difficulties. In America, too, we have an electoral law that makes a mockery of the concept of "one person, one vote." Each state is apportioned two Senators in the US Senate - that means that tiny Wyoming (pop. 500,000) and gigantic California (pop. 34,000,000) have the same voice in the higher legislative chamber. And there's no tent camp laying siege to Congress.
What causes tension in Lebanon is not the imperfections of its laws, but a fundamental difference among its people over the course of the country. This is not exactly groundbreaking news. The different sects have different visions of Lebanon's future. Energy would be better spent trying to reconcile these visions and building bridges between the communities, than dealing with distractions such as an interim President.
July 14, 2007
Chateau In the Clouds

This lovely place is the Chateau du Domaine de Saint-Francois d'assise, in La Celle Saint-Cloud, France. I believe that it is the chateau where the assorted Lebanese lieutenants are meeting; all news reports mention a "chateau" and this was the only chateau I could find. If they are meeting at a different chateau, it is relatively immaterial. If you have seen one French chateau, you have seen them all.
The meeting place is not entirely irrelevant. The hope is that, by getting the leaders away from their supporters, they will be more willing to listen to opposing views and, therefore, compromise. Nor is the meeting being held in Paris. The parties are secluded together, without much to do but listen to each other speak. Of course, the big bosses in Lebanon will be able to reach their lieutenants, but they will not presumably have suites of offices where armies of advisors vet every statement. The diplomatic strategy is to encourage out-of-the-box thinking, and spontaneity.
La Celle Saint-Cloud isn't far from the city of Versailles. There are two morals one could take away from this. More pessimistic observers may observe that France decision not to use the famous Palace of Versailles is a sign of the weight they put on the Lebanese crisis, while more optimistic individuals may suggest that the city's diplomatic magic remains tainted from the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. Writer Hillaire Belloc hailed from La Celle Saint-Cloud and, despite his prodigious talent, should probably not be considered a worthy patron saint of the negotiations. Belloc was known for his anti-Islamic views, and wrote extensively on war. Here is a passage of his -- an adapted Christmas song -- that, hopefully, Celle Saint-Cloud's Lebanese guests do not stumble over:
'May all good fellows that here agree
Drink Audit Ale in heaven with me,
And may all my enemies go to hell!
Noel! Noel! Noel! Noel!
May all my enemies go to hell!
Noel! Noel!'
July 13, 2007
Details Of A Disaster
"This victory is too big to be comprehended by us. The next weeks, months, and years will confirm this." - Hassan Nasrallah, "Divine Victory" Speech, September 22, 2006
"There is no longer a state within a state. There is no longer sponsorship for a terror organization by a state. And no longer is a terror organization allowed to operate within Lebanon, as the long arm of the axis of evil..." -Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Knesset Speech, August 14, 2006
What is there to say about the anniversary of the July War? Lebanon lost much of what it had to lose: its national cohesion, its economic growth, its citizens' lives. Approximately 1,200 civilians were killed, 118,000 housing units were destroyed, $2.4 billion of Lebanese economic infrastructure was destroyed, 12,000 tons of oil were spilled -- the facts go on. Politically, external actors have found it even easier to infringe on Lebanese weakened sovereignty. In the past year, Israel drones have repeatedly violated Lebanese airspace, Palestinian militants have battled the Lebanese army for almost two months around Tripoli, and Syria invaded 3 kilometers into Lebanon in the Bekaa.
And what political gains justify this destruction? The war even failed to produce a decisive victor -- it will be refought soon, with even more destruction. Olmert's statements ring as false as Nasrallah's. A year later, this is still the legacy of the July War: declarations devoid of substance, and deaths devoid of meaning.
July 10, 2007
Her Israel
Read this profile of Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni in the New York Times Magazine. I would write more on it, but I have to run. Briefly, it's a good synopsis of the three forces which pull the Israeli system: the dream of a Jewish state, of a democratic state, and of Greater Israel. Livni's story, like so many other Israeli politicians, is her efforts to balance these three conflicting ideals.
July 9, 2007
Three Cheers For Disunity
Showing the sort of insight and political savvy which has characterized the Christian leadership recently, Archbishop Bishara Raii accused the government of "Islamizing" Lebanon. That was the statement which drew headlines. But the comment was part of a larger discussion in the Maronite Patriarchy, lamenting that "Christian disunity" in the current struggle had weakened the Christians' voice in Lebanon's political affairs.
I'm going to ignore the charge that the government is "Islamizing" Lebanon, simply because it is too absurd for many people to buy into it. The rallying cry of Christian unity is a far more potent weapon. But why should anybody working towards a non-sectarian vision of Lebanon's future care? Christian disunity is a good thing -- it shows that Lebanon's politicians hold principles beyond the advancement of their sect. Of course, the "principles" which animate the FPM seem to be nothing more than a willingness to ally themselves with anyone who promises Aoun the Presidency. But, though one must disagree with either Geagea or Aoun's stances, it is true that they both hold political beliefs that supercede their loyalty to their common Christianity.
The political deadlock has ruined a great deal of potential in Lebanon. Its saving grace has been the fact of Christian parties working hand-in-hand with both Shia and Muslim groups, in a direct contrast to the Christian-Muslim split which was the driving force behind the civil war. Leave it to the Patriarchy to attack the one bright spot of the current conflict.
July 7, 2007
Don't Know Much About History?
I apologize for disappearing, and then promptly writing about 13th and 14th century history in Asia Minor. But trust me, there is a point about Lebanese politics hidden beneath all this.
Once upon a time, the Byzantine Empire -- centered around Istanbul and stretching across modern-day Turkey -- was crumbling. It would survive in some form or another until the mid-15th century, but the reason for its decline was clear centuries earlier. Turkish warriors established statelets on the Eastern border of Byzantine territory, from which they plundered Byzantine territory and seized land. The raiders called themselves ghazis -- warriors for their Islamic faith against the Byzantine infidels. Their loyalties were fluid, flowing to whichever state was most successful in carrying out attacks on Byzantine land.
The ghazi states competed in a primitive, rough meritocracy. Legitimacy was gained from tearing off pieces of the crumbling Byzantine Empire. Victory brought more ghazis, and swelled a state's territory. And the ghazi state controlled by Osman was one of the most successful, most daring, in advancing the ghazi state.
In the time of Osman, the statelet was one of the smaller ghazi territories in Asia Minor. Those to the east, further away from Byzantine territory, had more developed bureaucracies and methods for political control. But Osman possessed a long border with the Byzantine Empire. This gave him, and his successors, the opportunity to raid and plunder at will, growing quickly in size and prestige. Fighters from the other statelets flocked to the new Osman state. This little foothold in Asia Minor would form the seed of the new Ottoman Empire.
Ghazi culture is alive and well today. Groups from Fatah al-Islam and Hamas to Hizbullah win loyalty and supporters for their prowess in fighting Israel. Of course, they lack the redeeming qualities of 13th century ghazis who eventually created the Ottoman Empire, which surpassed the Byzantine Empire by any imaginable standard. But the need for a frontier with the enemy state, and the fact that their legitimacy rests on combat with it, remains the same. And, of course, does much to explain skepticism about hopes for "negotiations" with these groups, or the possibility of them accepting any buffer between them and their prey.
July 2, 2007
To Your Corners
So, pro-government Lebanese Parliamentarians have been voting with their feet and fleeing the country since Eido's assassination. This was the impression that I got, too, when trying to track down MPs down for information on what sort of man Eido had been immediately following the assassination. Since I doubt that most MPs have the resources to provide themselves with top-notch security, I can hardly blame them. But it does exacerbate an already-serious breakdown in communication between March 8th and March 14th.
Hassan Nasrallah moves around Lebanon like a ghost, listening for the hum of approaching Israeli warplanes. Berri sits in his compound near Verdun, and Aoun -- well, who cares what Aoun does. Siniora appears to only leave the Grand Serail when he flies to Paris, Hariri must be starting to see Qoreitem as a prison instead of a palace, and I don't think Walid Jumblatt is going to be taking any vacations in Damascus soon. Anti-government lawmakers can't go to America, and pro-government lawmakers can't stay in Beirut.
I can't say that I blame any of these politicians for hunkering down in their bunkers. However, the fact is that this isolation results in the widening of the gap between the two factions. Their only meetings are carefully scripted negotiation sessions. Other than that, they are cooped up with partisans of their own side. They all say that they are attempting to bridge the gap between the factions, but their increased isolation turns those divisions into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
July 1, 2007
Another Reporter, Gone
The story of a brave, dead reporter -- the 106th journalist killed in Iraq:
The event, as far as we know now, was chillingly mundane and ruthlessly efficient. Visiting the nearby town of Irbil on an errand related to her work, Sahar decided to drive to Mosul for the day. Was it just to see friends and family? Perhaps to tend to some final logistical matters? Or was she pursuing a story?
It took only those few hours for extremists to discover she was there and to come for her in the morning. A group of assassins confronted her outside her home in the early hours and gunned her down. A statement to the local media claiming responsibility on behalf of the extremist group Ansar al-Sunna stated that she was cooperating with the Iraqi police and the occupying forces and was 'writing false reports about the mujaheddin to distort the truth.' When her cellphone rang after the deed, one of her killers said into the receiver, 'She has gone to hell.'"
Read the whole thing, please.
It's A Wide, Wide World
Good for President Bush for barring pro-Syrian, anti-government forces from entering the U.S. Nevertheless, this decision likely had nothing to do with protecting Lebanese democracy -- and very little to do with Lebanon at all, as a matter of fact.
Of all of America's weapons to affect Mideast policy, this is merely a symbolic one. Let's be honest -- how many of the ten "examples" of those affected by the ban, such as Syrian military intelligence chief Asef Shawkat, were really planning a vacation to the Grand Canyon? For more low-level operatives, the policy could conceivably be an annoyance -- but, given their stake in toppling Siniora's government, it's not going to convince anybody to change sides in the larger struggle.
Also, look at what is happening in the United States right now. Bush is hosting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Maine today. Putin is a Syria ally -- though his decision not to veto the international tribunal was a welcome split from the Assads. By barring anti-government forces from the United States before the Russian delegation arrives, Bush sends a strong signal that he is not going to back down to Putin. Sure, the decision nominally benefits Lebanon -- but only incidentally, as a side effect to its intended purpose.
Just another reminder -- as if one was needed -- about Lebanon's desperate need for local, nationalist leaders who don't need to rely on America, Saudi Arabia, France, Syria, or Iran to keep their country together.
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