Causes, and Effects

I came across this passage in a lefty American magazine, on the plight of Lebanon's Palestinians. It is the type of bien pensant statement that is actually fairly common:

"Indeed, one of the outcomes of the perpetual 'war on terror' is the emergence of many mini bin-ladens, whose perspectives are essentially nihilistic and murderous. Such gangs (Fatah al-Islam) are vehemently opposed by the overwhelming majority of Palestinians in Lebanon."

This, I think, gets the situation exactly backwards. Fatah al-Islam, originally a group of maybe 200 Syrian-funded wackos, would not have been able to take over Nahr al-Bared without at least the tacit support of the Palestinians in the camp. In the comments, Jeha suggested that other, non-Fatah Palestinian factions have been fighting with Fatah al-Islam, and I believe him. It is not believable that the sundry, indistinguishable Palestinian Islamist groups in the refugee camps are hated by the good, reasonable Palestinian people. The majority of Palestinians could have stopped the disaster at Nahr al-Bared, if they had desired. The ugly truth is that they chose not to.

This is a much harder battle than simply killing Fatah al-Islam, and then happily returning to the status quo. It will require systematic changes to the way the camps are administered -- the gradual spread of Lebanese sovereignty over the area and the gradual extension of rights to the Palestinian people. Carrots and sticks, both designed to give the Palestinians a stake in a future Lebanon that does not involve groups such as Fatah al-Islam.

Victory or defeat in the Battle for Nahr al-Bared will be determined as much by politicians meeting in boardrooms, as it will by soldiers on the field. But I have a feeling that it is going to be a battle that fewer people are going to be interested in winning.