Mocking Hamas

Here's a story that should require no comment:

"Hamas TV has axed a Mickey Mouse lookalike who made worldwide headlines for preaching Islamic domination and armed struggle to youngsters.

The station broadcast what it said was the last episode of a weekly children's show featuring the character named Farfour.

In the final skit, Farfour was beaten to death by an actor posing as an Israeli official trying to buy Farfour's land.

At one point, Farfour called the Israeli a "terrorist."

"Farfour was martyred while defending his land," said Sara, the teen presenter.

It is my firm, principled belief that we do not make fun of Islamist movements to the extent that they deserve. Oh sure, there are plenty of voices disagreeing with them, but that's not what I'm referring to. They should also be satired, parodied, mocked, ridiculed, belittled -- and this is not done nearly enough. Sure, the Salafi desire to change the world back into some 7th century idyll is evil and harmful, but what is often forgotten is that it also rather silly.

It's Not Paranoia If the Danes Are Really Out To Get You

I think we all know who is really causing all this trouble in Lebanon. No, not Syria. Hizbullah? No way. It's the Danes, of course.

But seriously, Danish paranoia (sound like some drastic weight-loss plan when written that way) is spreading throughout Beirut. It's sort of the reductio ad absurdum of xenophobia; if you are petrified of an influx of Danes into Lebanon, hellbent on its destruction, then you really can't trust anybody.

One of my good friends in Beirut is from a Moroccan background, and holds a passport from Denmark. Obviously, none of this was a problem for most of the time he has been here. He was traveling during the whole Danish terrorist incident, and had planned to go right from his trip back to Copenhagen. However, he missed his flight, and found himself stranded back in Beirut for a few days. He went back to the apartment where he had been living (and which he was still paying rent for) and, to make a long story short, the landlord was not happy to see him. "What are you doing back? You said you were leaving! Don't you know that the security situation now? They can arrest you just for being Danish!"

To make a long story short, I ended up with a very angry Dane sleeping on my couch last night. But I guess it is nice to know that Lebanon, whose government has not solved one assassination or bombing for the last three decades, still have time to clamp down on the Danish threat.

Supposed To Be So Different

It's not funny, exactly -- maybe just a little hat-tip to natural human optimism -- that, when the public is polled about their hopes for the Arab-Israeli peace process, the portion of people who are "optimistic" are always given top billing. Like today, when we learn that 42% of Israelis are optimistic that a settlement could be reached with PLO chief Abbas, and 31% of Palestinians think peace could be made with the current Israeli leadership. In a poll on virtually any other subject, the headline would refer to the 58% majority of Israelis, and the 69% majority of Palestinians. But I digress.

Relations between Israel and the West Bank (let's forget, for a moment, Gaza) are, for what it's worth, certainly in a unique place. When was the last time Israel and the PLO were both guided by such comically weak leaders? I suppose there is a certain opportunity in that -- since it's almost mathematically impossible for either to lose more standing, they might both try something new and radical. The problem will be convincing their respective people to go along, rather than reaching a deal on paper.

How weak is Mahmoud Abbas right now? He makes the Lebanese government look like one of those centuries-long Chinese dynasties. 41% of Palestinians support dissolving the Palestinian Authority. Overall, 26% want it replaced with an "international trusteeship" (shades of the post-WWII Middle East), and 16% want the full return of the Israeli occupation. Which, if I was a Palestinian nationalist, would be the most upsetting fact of the bunch.

Heading Towards Internationalization?

It's funny -- this all started over a few Ministers. Just give us a minority veto over the government's actions, said Hizbullah, and we'll shut down the protest. And now, the Lebanese are being forced to consider whether they want to abandon the Middle East economically (and maybe politically?), in favor of trading partner and allies across the Mediterranean. Someday, 2006-7 Lebanon will be used as a textbook example for how crisis situations can escalate from narrow demands into fundamental disputes over identity. But we're not quite ready for the textbooks today; there are still decisions to be made.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion, after the recent UN report, that the recurrent, boringly predictable crises with Syria will never end without enhanced border control. "There is no (cross border) cooperation," said the report. There are "several heavily armed Palestinian military strongholds" on both sides of the Syrian-Lebanese border, said the report. There is "a steady flow of weapons and armed elements across the border from Syria," the report said. I apologize for the repetitiveness of this laundry list, but it needs to be said. And, of course, the coup de grace:

"The team said it was unable to document a single instance of a seizure of arms at or near the border during a three-week visit to a 200-mile stretch of territory that concluded June 15."

It is important to address root causes, not just their immediate manifestations. That is why I wrote about what needs to be done in the Palestinian refugee camps following the battle for Nahr al-Bared. And one big root cause for Lebanon's current instability is its porous border with Syria. Unless Syria magically becomes a good neighbor, nothing fundamental will change about Lebanon's security situation. But Syria has been very clear about what an international force on the border means: a complete shutting of all border crossings, effectively cutting Lebanon off from the rest of the Middle East.

My guess is Lebanon could survive the blockade through a combination of modern technology, help from its Western allies, and good old-fashioned smuggling. But if you don't think that isolation from the rest of the Middle East would change Lebanon profoundly, both in economic and political terms, well -- you haven't been living here for the last six months.

Causes, and Effects

I came across this passage in a lefty American magazine, on the plight of Lebanon's Palestinians. It is the type of bien pensant statement that is actually fairly common:

"Indeed, one of the outcomes of the perpetual 'war on terror' is the emergence of many mini bin-ladens, whose perspectives are essentially nihilistic and murderous. Such gangs (Fatah al-Islam) are vehemently opposed by the overwhelming majority of Palestinians in Lebanon."

This, I think, gets the situation exactly backwards. Fatah al-Islam, originally a group of maybe 200 Syrian-funded wackos, would not have been able to take over Nahr al-Bared without at least the tacit support of the Palestinians in the camp. In the comments, Jeha suggested that other, non-Fatah Palestinian factions have been fighting with Fatah al-Islam, and I believe him. It is not believable that the sundry, indistinguishable Palestinian Islamist groups in the refugee camps are hated by the good, reasonable Palestinian people. The majority of Palestinians could have stopped the disaster at Nahr al-Bared, if they had desired. The ugly truth is that they chose not to.

This is a much harder battle than simply killing Fatah al-Islam, and then happily returning to the status quo. It will require systematic changes to the way the camps are administered -- the gradual spread of Lebanese sovereignty over the area and the gradual extension of rights to the Palestinian people. Carrots and sticks, both designed to give the Palestinians a stake in a future Lebanon that does not involve groups such as Fatah al-Islam.

Victory or defeat in the Battle for Nahr al-Bared will be determined as much by politicians meeting in boardrooms, as it will by soldiers on the field. But I have a feeling that it is going to be a battle that fewer people are going to be interested in winning.

Hamas's Mistake?

At least one commentator thinks Hamas erred by staging an armed coup in Gaza:

"Hamas already mostly controlled Gaza. It is hard to imagine what gains it can reap from its 'victory.' But it is easy to see the losses. Fatah, and the government of its leader Mahmoud Abbas, will be able to restore their strength in the West Bank with the eager assistance of virtually the whole outside world, while Gaza will be shut off and denied outside aid far more strictly than during the past year. Israel will retaliate against shelling with a freer hand. Egypt will tighten its border. And Hamas has in one swoop negated its own supreme achievement, namely winning a majority in Palestine's 2006 parliamentary elections. Until now, Hamas had a powerful argument: how can the West demand democracy and then boycott the winners? But now it is Hamas itself that has destroyed Palestinian democracy by staging an armed coup. Its democratic credentials have gone up in the smoke of its own arson."

Well, I don't know. I'm not familiar with too many people who truly believed that Hamas was committed to democratic institutions to begin with, and I doubt that protecting democracy is high on Hamas's list of priorities either. But I don't particularly care whether the violent seizure of power in Gaza was bad for Hamas. It was certainly bad for the Palestinian cause at large -- a fact their self-proclaimed leaders no longer seem to care about.

Talk Shop

So Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa is gone, and we are no closer to peace than before he came. I doubt this comes as much of a surprise to those who follow politics closely. But, given the excessive media coverage surrounding his every statement and visit, it wouldn't surprise me to learn if some regular Lebanese were convinced that his visit meant that peace was nigh.

Here's what I wrote for Now Lebanon:

"[T]he truth is that Amr Moussa arrives in Beirut with limited goals, and even more limited means to achieve them. Without unanimity among the Arab states, he cannot pressure any group to agree to a compromise solution. The Arab League delegation attracts a great deal of attention for holding high-level meetings with every faction involved in Lebanon's political crisis. It is only when the cameras go off, and the time comes to make hard decisions, that the Arab League falls disturbingly silent."

The Lebanese political deadlock will not be solved by the rhetorical brilliance of Amr Moussa. We moved beyond the situation where fancy words could cause either side to shift from their entrenched positions long ago. There are structural differences between March 8th and March 14th, and the factions will only be moved by structural changes in the Lebanon's political landscape. Amr Moussa cannot control any of the levers that could force a compromise -- a large shift of popular support, the election of a President, or the withdrawal of aid from a foreign patron. Without any weapons to pressure either side, Moussa might as well have been talking into a vacuum.

While We're Talking Hardball Politics...

Here is what I believe, though cannot prove, prompted Murr's statement. The Minister of Defense found himself in a battle to determine the next stage of the battle of Nahr al-Bared. Opposing political forces -- most likely in the Army itself, who by all accounts want blood -- were threatening to pursue Fatah al-Islam to the last man, and fight deep into the camp. Murr was concerned about the cost -- in life, equipment, and time -- the battle would entail. But it has been an open question if the army would back off from its attack, even under direct command from its political leaders.

So, what is Murr's solution? Declare victory. Announce that the army "has destroyed all Fatah al-Islam positions," and that this victory "is dedicated to the Lebanese people." Explain that "what is happening now is some cleanup that the army's heroes are carrying out."

The army is now faced with two choices: directly disobey their nominal boss, or abandon any plans to push the battle into the old camp. With the public in a celebratory mode, it would be hard to build the political support necessary for another support. What is Michel Sulaiman supposed to say? "No, Murr's wrong. We didn't win!" Much safer to take a bow, accept the praise, and quietly begin a long siege and some very hush-hush negotiations.

Or maybe I've been in the Middle East too long, and see conspiracies everywhere. But experience says that politics is a game which is just as dirty and cutthroat as military operations themselves.

What Victory Means -- And Doesn't Mean

While I hate to rain on everybody's parade, there are some uncomfortable facts that accompany Elias Murr's declaration of "victory" last week.

First, it is important to note that the Defense Secretary was the only person to declare victory. The army stayed mum. I don't believe Siniora has said anything to back up his minister. Murr's announcement was more of a political manuever than a statement of military reality: the politicians want to avoid sending the army into the "old part" of Nahr al-Bared, and fight it out street for street with Fatah al-Islam. So the alternative is to declare victory, and quietly lay siege to Nahr al-Bared until the terrorists decide to come out with their hands up.

Mustapha's map of Nahr al-Bared is a great resource here. What the army accomplished was clearing the "new part" of Nahr al-Bared of militants. This was the overspill from the original refugee camp, which was made up of multi-storey concrete buildings. They did not go into the "old part" of the camp, which is made up of twisting, narrow alleyways and one-storey shanties. Given the geography of the old camp, the fear is that an all-out attack would make the current fighting seem like a cakewalk.

Second, victory does not mean an end to the fighting. Friday's violence proved this point. The army will either need to starve Fatah al-Islam out, kill them, or make a deal with them. And that, of course, is the great danger that Murr's statement brings to the fore. There is the prospect that Lebanon will declare victory, the army will be feted across the country -- and, in the ensuing celebration, the remaining militants will be quietly ushered out of the country.

Finally, victory does not mean an end to the problem of Palestinian militancy in the camps. Nahr al-Bared is only one of twelve camps. No fundamental problems have been resolved. The camps are still outside of Lebanese authority, under the influence of Syrian intelligence services, and made up of individuals who are economically disenfranchised. Until each of these issues are addressed, the Palestinian refugee camps will remain an open wound on the Lebanese nation.

Half Full, or Half Empty?

Mustapha, at Beirut Spring, worries that the crescendoing reports of an imminent Army victory are simply a smoke-screen for a shady deal between the Palestinian militants and the Lebanese army. According to Al-Jazeera, this deal involves letting Fatah al-Islam leave the camp with their lives -- they will be deported outside of Lebanon, and their weapons will be given to a security force of Palestinians, which will assume responsibility of the camp.

I don't have a crystal ball that tells me whether Al-Jazeera's report is true, though it does seem that a sleazy deal of this sort would have made more sense a few weeks ago. Since the Army has taken the fighting this far, it makes more sense to finish the battle than negotiate a compromise. But that is circumstantial. The more important question is a larger one: what has Nahr al-Bared taught us about the strengths and weaknesses of the Army?

It is a hard question to address honestly, because of all the mushy tributes to the fallen soldiers, the valentines to our men in uniform, and the media's constant promises of an imminent Army victory (for the past three weeks or so). One doesn't want to appear insensitive. However, from a military perspective, it is clear that the Army is a work in progress. A bunch of upstarts in one Palestinian camp have consumed their attention for over thirty days. According to the latest body count that I saw, on Friday from Agence France Presse, 64 Army soldiers had been killed, along with 60 Fatah al-Islam terrorists. The fact that Fatah al-Islam is killing more Army members than the Army kills Fatah al-Islam is disconcerting, to say the least.

On the other hand, the Army has certainly won a giant "moral" victory. The New York Times notes today that the Army "has served as a rare source of unity in this otherwise fractured land." The fact that all sects feel a strong link to the Army is not for nothing. It will lose that goodwill if it is shown to be ineffective, but at the moment it is the strongest institution in Lebanon. And because of that, it needs to be strengthened -- so it can be a practical source of strength, and not just an moral one.

Countering Stereotypes, But...

So yes, this article on the happy-go-lucky beachgoers in Tripoli is a valuable piece. It promises to counter stereotypes about Tripoli as an Islamist haven, provide a nuanced view of the Middle East, yadda yadda yadda. But some editor should have had the good graces to cut this one line:

"'I've come here with my parents to stay in our seaside bungalow to swim, sunbathe, have fun with my friends and forget the war,' says Sarah, whose pink two-piece swimsuit hugs the curves of her adolescent body."

While I'm aware, and glad, that we can all be fun-loving and liberal in Tripoli these days, I still think that grown men shouldn't write journalism that could be confused with soft-core porn. Go ahead, call me a prude.

Read This, And Try Not To Gag

Truth be told, I don't have much interest in arguing with the American far Left these days. A pundit whose name I now forget once said that liberalism now resembled a dead animal lying on the side of the road. Various people come by and poke it with a stick, looking for a reaction, but it fails to do anything interesting. To be honest, these days I find leftists ranting about American or Lebanese politics to not be so much infuriating, as boring.

So, it is a special day when I came across this tribute from the Syrian government to anti-war activist Cindy Sheehan. Ms. Sheehan, you see, is "retiring" from the anti-war movement; riding off into the blazing sunset, or something to that effect. Here's how Syrian Minister of Expatriate Affairs Dr. Buthayna Sha'ban bids her adieu:

"[Sheehan] states that her aim was to bring about a change in the norms of the American regime, and this is something that [the regime] strictly forbids, since a change of norms would mean a change in the [U.S.] stance on Palestine, Lebanon, Sudan, and Somalia. [A change of norms] could dictate a policy completely different from the present one, and the two American parties cannot afford this, unless they decide they want a foreign policy completely unlike the one currently employed by the U.S., in which the two parties differ only in tone and degree but not in essence...

"I do not know whether Cindy Sheehan will rescind her decision. But I hope she will, because the battle is an important and a crucial one. It is not a battle of the American people against the [American] administration, but a battle of truth against falsehood - of those who believe in justice and human dignity against those who see the world only [in terms of] oil, wealth and hegemony..."

Ah, to be declared a peacemaker by the Syrian regime. Somehow, I don't think that Sheehan will appreciate the irony. More importantly, it is interesting to note that the language the Syrian government uses would be just as appropriate in a tribute written by a supposedly "progressive" magazine in the United States or Europe. It is not a coincidence.

Short, Simple Words

My Arabic, regrettably, is far from perfect, and that is something that I would like to apologize to my readership for. There are certain nuances that I am unable to unravel, various arguments that appear to be outside my ability to understand. This was my reaction after reading the translated statements of Hizbollah and the FPM's leaders regarding the assassination of Walid Eido. Perhaps it is easier to obfuscate in Arabic than it is in English. I do not know.

What is Hezbollah MP Fadlallah's response to the killing? "[W]e told them (the majority) let us not just condemn it... let us adopt serious steps" to resolve the deadlock. In other words -- give us our unity government, and your MPs won't be blown up. In English, we have a simple word for that sort of argument: blackmail. Fadlallah made his comments at a funeral. Where other people see coffins, he apparently sees bargaining chips.

But at least Hezbollah is consistent. They want to seize power by any means necessary, and they are not particularly shy in announcing it. In comparison, the Aounist response was not so much evil as it was intellectual incoherent.

"Another opposition group, the Free Patriotic Movement of prominent Christian leader Michel Aoun, said on Sunday it did not oppose by-elections -- as long as Lahoud signs the decree.

'We are all for by-elections, but we want to protect the constitution and we do not accept that any harm be done to the prerogatives of the president of the republic,' spokesman Antoine Nasrallah told AFP."

I am sympathetic to the argument that the rule of law must be respected, even if one disagrees with it. There is some truth to the FPM's position, and they should be praised for it. But their statement is only half of an argument. The FPM is mum on whether they want Lahoud to approve of the by-elections. Will they do anything to pressure him to sign off? Surely, Michel Aoun must have at least some influence left in March 8th. Lahoud's decision to validate the by-elections must set just as important a precedent as respecting the president's perogatives.

Please, let the problem be in the translation.

Staying Safe In Beirut

By definition, there are not a great many rules in war. However, there are a few -- and 2007 Beirut is no exception. With this in mind, I have taken the liberty to write up a list of rules for staying safe in Lebanon. It is meant for a new arrival to this part of the world (though I am not quite sure who that may be), not quite sure what they are getting themselves in to.

While the perceptive reader might detect a certain flippancy to my tone, this does not suggest a rejection of the rules' validity. On the contrary, there is a certain truth to each of them. If they seem absurd, the blame lies in the reality of Lebanese life, not the rules themselves. Now, without further ado:

• Rule 1. Immediately after a bomb goes off, the rest of Lebanon becomes one of the safest places on the world. One of the safest times to go out in Lebanon is after an explosion. This is because the terrorists would never set two bombs in one night -- it is one of the first rules in the Terrorist's Handbook.

• Rule 2. After a neighborhood has been bombed, it is safe. See also: Terrorist's Handbook. After all, Lebanon is a big place and there are only so many bombs in the world.

• Rule 3. After a large bomb attack, there will be a brief lull in the violence. It is completely safe to venture out in this period. During this time, the terrorists hold celebratory potluck dinners which distract them from carrying out additional violence.

• Rule 4. The bombs only come out in late evening and nighttime. If you are home before 8 p.m., you are safe. While this rule has been challenged recently, it remains widely believed. The fact is that terrorists are notoriously late risers, and their vaguely vampire-like habits make them more apt to carry out attacks at night.

• Rule 5. Please consult your neighbors and local dekken owners for neighborhood-specific reasons why the area in which you live is completely safe. They will be happy to provide answers. In Hamra, the reasons include the proximity of two major universities, and the presence of foreigners (which is bizarre, considering that Fatah al-Islam does not appear to have any qualms on this front).
  

A Fork In The Road -- Earlier Than Expected

The presidential elections were supposed to be the great gut check for March 8th and March 14th. It was a fork in the road -- the two sides would either choose to escalate the current divisions, or compromise. They would agree on a consensus candidate, the thinking went, or Lebanon would face the prospect of having two different Presidents and two rival governments.

Well, we may not have to wait that long for the rival factions to choose their paths. The assassination of Eido leaves March 14th increasingly afraid that their parliamentary majority will be whittled away with an assassination campaign. As I mentioned earlier, many majority MPs seem to have "gone to ground," spooked by the fear of assassination. In response, March 14th is calling for by-elections to fill the seats "vacated" (to use a peculiarly Lebanese euphemism) by MPs Walid Eido and Pierre Gemayel.

The fact that March 14 wants by-elections is not, by itself, particularly problematic. The situation gets tricky because Syrian Puppet/President Emile Lahoud will likely block any attempt to hold them. Furthermore, Parliament would need to pass a bill validating the by-elections -- and opposition leader Nabih Berri refuses to call Parliament into session. The Parliamentary majority is making noises about holding the by-elections and recognizing the winners anyway, over the objections of Lahoud and Berri.

It is not hard to see where this road takes us. March 14th will recognize the legitimacy of a 128-member Parliament, including the two new members. March 8th will recognize a 126-member Parliament. March 14th would simply ignore the authority of Lahoud to ratify their actions, and of Berri to call Parliament. Once that line is crossed, there is nothing to stop March 14th from holding Parliamentary sessions at their will.

Meanwhile, March 8th would deny the legitimacy of any of Parliament's actions. There would be two de facto governments, similar to what would happen if March 14th elected a new President and Lahoud stayed in office. After that point, Lebanon's fate would be anyone's guess. But there is no doubt that it would be a decisive split -- determining how Lebanon will develop in the near future, and what it will never be.

One Growth Industry In Lebanon: Dark Humor

I apologize for the absence of an update yesterday. I was at the office well into the evening, trying to run down MPs who had known Walid Eido for this tribute to him. Everyone was very helpful once I got them on the phone, but many anti-Syrian politicians seem to be hiding from public view, in fear that they will be next. This doesn't go for Hariri or Jumblatt, who need to be visible, but it does seem true for the people a few rungs beneath them. Understandable, of course.

Anyway, Jeha mentioned dark humor in a comment below, just as I was trying to think of something to write. It reminded me of a discussion I had with one MP yesterday, who was very friendly with Walid Eido. "He liked me very much, and I liked him," said the politician. "We used to joke around a lot."

Of course, I asked him what they joked about. "Well, when we would hold a meeting and the cameras would be there, I would turn to the photographers and say 'take a picture of Walid, this might be the last time you see him. He might get assassinated!' And Walid would say. 'No no, take a picture of him, he might get assassinated!'"

We laughed together about that and, for a second, I forgot that I was interviewing a man about his friend's death. Which, of course, is exactly the point of Lebanon's black humor.

What A Joke

Oh, so the international community condemned Eido's killing in the "strongest possible terms." I guess everyone can calm down now. Everything is going to be all right.

President Bush remarked, "efforts by Damascus and Tehran to foment instability in Lebanon must stop now."

French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner condemned the assassination as an, "odious and cowardly crime."

The EU wants to make sure that, "[t]he causes of this attack must be clarified and those responsible must be punished."

What a joke. How long will this attack delay the next visit from a European or American politician, who comes to Syria hat-in-hand, looking for a deal? A month? Two months, maximum. What concrete actions will be taken to punish Syria for the string of murders it has dragged across Beirut? Nothing; just some pretty words.

No, there won't be any significant help coming from overseas to save the government on this one. Unless, of course, you think car bombs can be stopped with strongly-worded memorandum. The leaders of March 14 find themselves in the place that all good nationalist leaders arrive eventually: all alone, with nobody to count on but themselves.

Notes On the Dead

Most of what I have to say about the explosion in Manara is already up on Now Lebanon's website. The explosion was on one of the tourist-dominated parts of Lebanon's Mediterranean shoreline. There are beaches in the area, as well as some good cafes. It is a miracle more people were not hurt. The location of the blast was about 15 minutes from my house, on the route where I jog four or five times a week.

One woman I talked to who was at the scene recounted how she was talking on her phone when the bomb went off: "Everyone ducked down, but I looked up for some reason."

She told me that MP Walid Edo's son, Khaled, had been at the site of the explosion. "They said they found his body parts in our cafe." That is how I learned he died.

Here is a passage from the piece my editor and I wrote:

"Alaa, a Jordanian visiting Lebanon, was staying close to Manara when the explosion occurred. "I came down to see what is wrong," she told NOW Lebanon. As for what will happen next in Lebanon? "God knows," sighed Alaa.

"I felt [the explosion]," she said. "The house started shaking. It felt like a very big one." She paused. "It is a bad feeling. The worst feeling."

This is what we were talking about, as traces of purple appeared in the sky and the crowd traded rumors on the number of the dead.

Peace...Now?

There is a lot to talk about regarding these French-Saudi-Iran peace talks, precisely because there is so little information out there. We know that peace talks are being organized in Paris. We know that they will attempt to find a resolution to the standoff, based on -- some brilliant plan, presumably. The vagueness of the plan has turned it into a Rorschach test for the Lebanese political class.

For that reason, it is interesting to note that the idea for the peace negotiations came about -- according to an Iranian News Agency -- from talks between Aoun and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner. It is also interesting that the Iranian government has been dropped from the list of sponsors, and that Gemayyel is sharpening his elbows against what may be a willingness to compromise on Saad Hariri's part.

Now, it is my turn to take the Rorschach test. First, anyone who believes that all the differences between Hizbullah and March 14 will be resolved at ony one peace conference needs to get another hobby. The differences will persist with or without a unity government, as long as Hizbullah keeps its weapons and Lebanon's sectarian system remains in place. The most important thing is to keep one's eye on the ball: what matters is how much the Lebanese political system is moving in a direction that disarms Hizbullah, and ends sectarianism. If the negotiations yield Hizbullah concessions that move the Lebanese political system closer to that reality, great. If this can only be accomplished in the current deadlock, that's okay too. It would be nice to lower the level of tension, but it is not the final goal.

Here are two other attempts at staring at the ink blot: Taylor Long doesn't see the point of the talks, while Firis Maksad seems fairly optimistic.

Al Qaeda Agrees With Me

We've been here before. Seymour Hersh says that Sunni Islamists would never work with the Syrian government, because they don't share the same ultimate goals. The Assads hate Al Qaeda; they massacred the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s! Hizbullah and Fatah al-Islam could never be on the same team; Fatah al-Islam considers them infidels! But America could have funded Fatah al-Islam, of course.

As I've said, this is crap. But don't take my word for it. Here's what one of Bin Laden's former bodyguards had to say about coordination between Al Qaeda and the Iranians:

Interviewer: "Do you think there is any coordination between the [Al-Qaeda] organization and Iran?"

Nasser Al-Bahri: "There is coordination on the basis of joint interests."

Interviewer: "In what way?"

Nasser Al-Bahri: "For example, there is a common enemy - the U.S. - and the Iranians, for your information, know that the [American] strike in inevitable. Therefore, they have to take advantage of all those available on the scene, including the Al-Qaeda organization."

Interviewer: "So the way you see it, the Al-Qaeda organization can cooperate with the Iranians against America?"

Nasser Al-Bahri: "It can cooperate with the Iranians but it won't operate under the Iranians. But there is no problem with regard to cooperation."

Seymour Hersh, call your office...

Lebanese Hospitality

He took a knife and carefully skinned the orange, so that the peel was left in one long spiral. Then he halved the orange, then quartered it, then cut it into eighths. But we couldn't eat it yet, of course. He had to find forks.

The two brothers tottered around the ruined house. They poured Arabic coffee into the tiny cups, slowly placed them in front of my companion and I. None for them. The forks were rested neatly on the side of the bowl of oranges. I was offered a cookie, I politely refused; the cookie was re-offered more vehemently, I accepted.

The bomb, which inaugurated this current string of terrorism, exploded next to a residential apartment adjacent to ABC Mall. A wall in the first floor apartment collapsed, killing an old woman. All the other residents left the destroyed building -- some escaped abroad, most are staying with relatives. Except the two brothers living on the fourth floor.

The government came by once -- not to provide any aid, of course. The man just said the building was unsafe -- structurally unsound, you see -- and if they didn't leave they would be thrown in jail. The brothers refused. They had lived in their house since 1956. Through the violence in 1958, through the civil war, through the bombings in 2005. They said they wanted to die in their home.

And now they were rushing around their house without windows, without walls, while it crumbled slowly around them. Making sure that everything was perfect for my snack.

Just maybe, no matter how many political battles are fought and lost, everything will be all right.

Mr. Nice Country

Less than two weeks ago -- though, given the recent pace of news, it seems like an eternity -- the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1757, to set up the international tribunal. The one dark spot on an otherwise wonderful day was the abstention of Qatar, the only Arab country with a Security Council vote.

Qatar's vote was strange on a few levels. The tiny emirate is considered a pro-Western, pro-Saudi country -- it houses America's largest military base in the Middle East, and maintains strong relations with its larger neighbor. It has also concerned itself with Lebanon in the past; Qatar gave $250 million to rebuild Bint Jbail, and its leader was the first Arab leader to visit Lebanon after last summer's war.

I spent a good part of last week learning about Qatar's foreign policy, and trying to put their vote into context of their larger goals. It was an interesting task, in the same way it would be interesting to study other historical oddities -- say, a dodo bird or a platypus. What I found was that, though Qatar works very hard to cultivate an image of being a modern, liberal country, at the end of the day they are primarily concerned with their petro-dollars. Here's a passage from my article:

"Before Qatar discovered that it was floating on a sea of oil, it was one of the poorest countries in the world. Now, it is one of the richest. As a tiny state, only slightly larger than Lebanon, Qatar does not dream of being a major regional power. Instead, it is primarily interested in sustaining its booming economy. To do so, it needs to keep the oil flowing, and maintain the broadest possible range of trade partners. The country's foreign policy can best be understood as a form of benevolent realpolitik -- essentially, the Qataris use their oil wealth to buy the goodwill of their neighbors. Any concern over the political alignment or long-term goals of other states is secondary."

Anyway, read the whole thing. I wrote this for Now Lebanon magazine, where I will be working full time for the next few months, at least. It's a great new resource for people interested in politics and culture in Lebanon, and I expect that it is going to be very popular.

The Problem With the Bombs

Okay, there are plenty of problems with the explosions which still terrorize Beirut. The one last night murdered an innocent man in Zouk Mosbeh. The overwhelming odds are that he had nothing to do with politics; he was just working late. Normal people would just see a hard-working guy, going about his business. Some bastard saw a chance to make a political point at the cost of his life.

Another problem is this: the explosions demand our attention but, intellectually, they are a dead-end. They do not provide any new evidence about the culprit behind the crimes. They do not help us determine what must be done to bring peace to Lebanon. Lebanon is no closer to bringing the guilty to justice than it was when the man in Zouk Mosbeh was alive.

I have been perfectly clear about who is responsible for this waves of attacks. If the Syrian state was run by the Canadian government, the citizens of Beirut would not need to abandon the streets by ten o'clock every night. But I have no more evidence for this proposition than I did after the first bomb went off. Each new explosion must be reported, written on, thought about -- they suck up our attention, without really providing any answers.

In other news, the sites of the explosions have become great ways to direct taxi drivers. "Serveesayn a Sad Bouchrieh, hadd l-imfijaar" takes one directly to the site of the crime -- of course, you have to specify which explosion you want to visit.

What Doesn't Change

As the Lebanese Army battles Fatah al-Islam, the attention of most Lebanese is focused entirely on the north. Normal life changes to accommodate the news cycle and the threat of bombs -- even our politicians (with the notable exception of Nasrallah) have managed to seem downright cordial with each other. And then there are the things that don't change. As Lebanese focus on the north, what is happening down south?

Syria has been strengthening its forces along the Golan Heights, moving rockets into place similar to the ones that Hizbullah fired into Northern Israel during last summer's war. Meanwhile, an Israeli military intelligence officer warns that Hizbullah is simply ignoring the presence of international peacekeepers, and rebuilding their military strength south of the Litani River. At this point, the purpose of UNIFIL is -- what, exactly? To act as Hizbullah's human shields?

Fresh from his election victory, and no doubt seeing his commanding margin of victory (in the one-man race) as a vote of support, Assad is talking tough: "The Golan Heights region is not open to negotiation," he told the newly-elected Syrian Parliament. The twin threat of Syria and Hizbullah forces have spooked Israel about a surprise attack. In response, they carried out military exercises on a mock-Syrian town.

As they say: developing...

The Bombs Are Back

A bomb exploded on an empty bus in Sid el Baucherieh, a Christian neighborhood in east Beirut. The explosion took place near Mar Tala church.

Al-Jazeera and Haaretz have articles up about the story -- but the Blacksmiths of Lebanon is outdoing both of them right now, with pictures of the explosion, and the helpful piece of background that this area is near other terrorist attacks, such as the assassination of Pierre Gemayel in 2006.

The number of wounded currently rests at ten. No word on fatalities, yet. More news in this space as the story develops.

Jund al-Sham For Dummies

Unlike Fatah al-Islam, Jund al-Sham has some history behind it. The first Jund al-Sham was founded in Afghanistan in 1999, by none other than Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the organization was scattered. Franchises started popping up like Starbucks after that. The group in Ain el-Helwe announced itself in 2004, another group appeared in Damascus in 2005 (and was subsequently persecuted by the Assads), and finally, another Jund al-Sham claimed responsibility for the March 2005 bombing of a theatre in Doha, Qatar. It's not clear the extent to which these groups are connected, or merely share a name.

The ideology of Jund al-Sham is the same as Fatah al-Islam in the North. They're Sunni fundamentalists, and want to re-establish an Islamic caliphate in the Levant and beyond. Upon the founding of the Jund al-Sham in Ain al-Helwe, they declared Christians and Shi'ites infidels. The leader of Jund al-Sham in Lebanon supposedly splintered off from Asbat al-Ansar, an older Sunni fundamentalist group that operates in the Palestinian camps.

Charming people.

(Photo: Lebanese Army soldiers mobilize at the entrance to the Taamir area, in Saida. RAMZI HAIDAR/AFP/Getty)

Fighting In Ain al-Helwe

The BBC has the story, and the Blacksmith is all over it as well.

Ain al-Helwe is a Palestinian refugee camp near Saida, a major Sunni city south of Beirut. Saida (the city's Arabic name; English speakers generally call is Sidon) is a majority Sunni city, just like Tripoli. According to the BBC, a soldier and a civilian were injured when a militant through a grenade at an army checkpoint.

Deutsche Press reports that the Lebanese Army responded with heavy machine gun fire in the Tameer area, east of Saida. The mainstream Palestinian organization Fatah aided the Lebanese Army by firing on Jund al-Sham militants within Ain al-Helwe.

Obviously, this is a potentially disastrous development. It has taken the Lebanese Army almost two weeks to organize and prepare for an assault on Naher al-Bared in the North. I think it is obvious that their forces are already spread thin taking care of Fatah al-Islam and, in case anyone has forgotten, preventing the outbreak of violence at the Hizbullah/Aoun tent camp in downtown Beirut.

As always in Lebanese politics, an explanation for the violence can only be reached by looking at multiple angles. First, Jund al-Sham militants obviously feel threatened by the Army's aggressive actions in Naher al-Bared; they also know that the Army doesn't have the resources to come down hard on them. Second, Fatah's ongoing battle with Hamas in Palestine may have weakened their ability to crack down on Islamist elements within the Lebanese camps. Third, there's always the chance that Syria is escalating its undeclared war on Lebanon by sponsoring yet more outbreaks of violence.

Quite a summer this is shaping up to be.

An Exercise In Opposites

June 1: "Iran Intends To Settle Lebanon's Crisis." That's the message Talal Arslan came away with, after meeting with the speaker of Iran's Majlis.

June 2: "Lebanon Problem To Be Solved By Lebanese Plans." That's what Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said, while criticizing the Western-backed international tribunal.

I just wish they would make up their minds.

They're In

The army entered Naher al-Bared today:

"In a dramatic flare up in fighting, tanks and armored personnel carriers rolled into the Nahr el Bared refugee camp on the outskirts of Tripoli early Friday, entering from the north in pursuit of militants belonging to Fatah al Islam, who are believed to have barricaded themselves deep inside residential neighborhoods in the camp.

It was not immediately clear how far the army had moved into the camp, and whether the offensive was simply an attempt to take more strategic positions and corner the militants or part of a final push to resolve the conflict. Light machinegun fire could be heard inside the camp, suggesting the troops had exited their personnel carriers and engaged the militants."

I don't want to pretend that I've entered Michel Sulaiman's head here, but it doesn' t seem feasible for the army to leave the camp until they have wiped out Fatah al-Islam. Anything else will look like a retreat. Check that; anything else will be a retreat.

Sulaiman has gotten a lot of good press recently for his ability to keep the army together at a difficult time. Even Robert Fisk is a fan. I heard him speak at a lecture last month, and he said something to the affect of "I normally don't like armies...but the Lebanese Army saved Lebanon in January."

Sulaiman is also a Maronite. There is plenty of precendent for divided countries turning to a military leader to unite them in (with generally poor results, I must add). Could Sulaiman emerge as a compromise candidate for the Presidency? I don't know a great deal about him, so maybe he carries baggage I'm not aware of. But if it happens, you heard it here first.

Do The Islamists Have Support In Tripoli?

If Nicholas Blanford is worried about growing support for Fatah al-Islam in the poorer areas of Tripoli, everyone else should probably be concerned as well. This is from an interview of a resident of Tebbaneh, one of the poorer areas of Tripoli:

"'The situation is unbearable for us right now. We feel the government's knives on our necks, and only Fatah al-Islam is there to protect us,' says local resident Mohammed Awad.

Graffiti on the stairwell of the Mahmoud family's dingy, rundown apartment building calls for God's blessing on Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq who was killed by US troops almost a year ago."

The week-long standoff between the Army and Fatah al-Islam does not do great thing for Army support in Tripoli. Not only does it make them seem unable to handle a challenge in their own backyard, the constant military clampdown risks alienating normal citizens. There is a natural pressure to reach a solution here -- whether it is a compromise, or total war on Fatah al-Islam. And I can't imagine what a compromise would look like.

The Army launched a new wave of artillery attacks on Fatah al-Islam today, in order to cover the advance of tanks to the camp's gate. It looks like the government might try to continue the momentum of the establishment of the international tribunal, and wipe out Fatah al-Islam once and for all this weekend. If the fighting goes well, we may seem a basic power shift in favor of Siniora. If not, well -- who knows.