A Good Day

It would, of course, be possible to go on for pages about all the things that are not perfect about the newly established international tribunal. Lebanese are still divided, the will of the international community might not extend to actually doing anything against Syria, and there is something fundamentally unsavory about Lebanese putting their hopes for salvation on something that happened in New York City. But I don't really want to write about any of that. This is the Middle East, and justice -- even imperfect justice -- is hard to come by.

There were scattered celebrations and fireworks on the street last night. But my favorite touch were the candles placed in doorways, and lining the Corniche. For my money, I prefer that simple and elegant form of political statement to the massive, baroque rallies that seem to be all the rage in Lebanon. There is a quiet confidence to all of the candles that no political rally, no matter how big or loud, can ever quite match.

In other news, Syria is continuing its quest to be the world's least subtle regime. A concussion grenade exploded near St. Michael's Church in Beirut, mere minutes after the UN vote establishing the tribunal. The next journalist to frame the current wave of violence as an "Al Qaeda vs. Lebanon" fight should be fired on the spot.

While we're on the topic, Syria's official objection to the international tribunal complained that the court "violates Lebanese sovereignty." Because we all know Syria has always been dreadfully concerned about Lebanese sovereignty.

Fly, Meet Ointment

This has to be one of the most disturbing paragraphs, on multiple levels, that I've read in a long time. The soldier being interviewed is a member of the Lebanese Army who is involved in the fight against Fatah al-Islam near Naher al-Bared:

"Ranger Rommel can't say how many people he has killed in the past few days. 'It must have been a lot,' says the 27-year-old, whose parents named him after the German Field Marshal who commanded the Nazi Afrikakorps. 'At first it was a shock to be in a real battle after all the training,' Rommel says. Later, he adds, it was like being in a movie. 'A drunk state in which you don't care whether you're shooting at children, the elderly or militants.'"[emphasis mine]

Where to begin? Mr. Rommel may think he received a lot of training, but if that is his reaction to being in a combat situation, he certainly did not receive enough. I am sure that the Lebanese Army is doing in best, and the mere fact that it can function at at all given the sectarian divisions of Lebanon is impressive. But it suffered from decades of neglect and underfunding when Syria was calling the shots, and quotes like these show that it has a long way to go. Their ability to decisively defeat Fatah al-Islam, while keeping civilian casualties to a minimum, is a major test to determine how far it has come.

Why The Army Will Invade Naher Al-Bared

This post, and the one below it, were originally posted on Abu Kais's From Beirut to the Beltway. I'm posting them here in case you missed them, and so that I'll be able to find them should I ever need to either gloat about my foresight, or eat my words.

"We are ready to die," said Fatah al-Islam's Abu Salim Teha.  One can only imagine that most Lebanon feel the same way about Teha.  There has been a bizarre, little pause in the last few days in Tripoli.  The fighting flares and then quickly dies down; only a few grenades have been tossed here in Beirut.  That's what passes for a lull in Lebanon, these days.  During the stalemate, U.S military aid has been rushed to the Lebanese Army, Naher al-Bared is being emptied of civilians, and the Palestinians are trying to broker a compromise.

But don't mistake the intermission for the end of the show.  The Lebanese Army probably will end up invading the camp, for both military and political reasons.  First, the obvious military reasons: thirty soldiers have died.  Armies do not just smile, accept that number of casualties, and walk away.  Fatah al-Islam is also an obvious danger to Lebanon's stability. The Palestinian negotiators have proposed a deal where Fatah al-Islam is allowed to walk away, maybe back to Syria.  There simply is no common ground here.  Unless its members are dead or in jail, Fatah al-Islam will remain a threat to Lebanon.

This also is a (for lack of a better word) good battle for the Lebanese Army to fight.  It is a popular cause -- Fatah al-Islam is widely reviled among all segments of the Lebanese population.  They even lack a base of support among the Palestinians.  Nobody is more aware of their reputation for being an ineffective fighting force than the Lebanese Army itself.  They are also aware that their authority within Lebanon is severely threatened by Hizbullah.  A total victory over Fatah al-Islam would do a great deal to establish their reputation as a serious fighting force, and their legitimacy as the defender of Lebanese security.

The government forces might also hope they can use the invasion of Naher al-Bared to drive a wedge in the opposition.  As Jeha pointed out, the FPM's site is currently a giant Valentine's Day card to the Lebanese Army.  They've pledged to support any action the Army deems necessary, while Hizbullah vows to oppose an incursion into the camp.   A prolonged battle within the camp would put stress on the Nasrallah/Aoun alliance, and establish a larger point about the Army's authority within all of Lebanon.  That's not the message a certain state-within-a-state wants to see the Army deliver.

Right now, the government is happy to equip its soldiers with shiny new weapons, evacuate civilians to make an assault less bloody, and make a show of looking for a negotiated solution.  But in the end, all the arrows point to a final, decisive battle.  The outcome will say a great deal about the strength of the army, and its ability to keep order in Lebanon.  Stick around.  This could be one of those weeks that define the political terrain for future months or years.

Through The Fog

Wars are funny things.  On the face of it, this one started for a seemingly apolitical reason -- a bank was robbed, and the army tried to arrest the criminals.  It could have been the plot of a particularly spectacular episode of Law and Order.  When the serious fighting broke out, the question of how the battle will affect the basic political terrain of Lebanon were irrelevant.  Over thirty soldiers have been killed; the terrorists have to die.  But how will Lebanon look different, after the smoke clears?

The most intriguing possibility is a crack-up of the pro-Syrian coalition.  While Nasrallah is warning that an incursion by the Lebanese Army into Naher el-Bared constitutes "a red line," the FPM supports "any action the army undertakes." (Hat Tip: Beirut Spring) When the matter is purely hypothetical, it is unlikely to break up the March 8th coalition -- all of whose parties are perfectly well aware of the cost of failure.  But in the event of a sustained army invasion of the camp, the split could widen.    

Meanwhile, I am sympathetic to a strategic argument against invading Naher el-Bared: a guerilla battle in narrow streets, with the distinct possibility of radicalizing the Palestinians present, should be avoided if at all possible.  The Lebanese Army also does not, presumably, want to set a precedent of assuming responsibility for patrolling the camps.  But I am confused by Hizbullah's moral qualms about the Lebanese Army entering Naher al-Bared.  The Shi'a militia opposes the Lebanese Army doing whatever it can to wipe out a group who considers them infidels because -- because -- why?  Maybe, because they are temporarily fighting for the same side.  Paging Seymour Hersh...

I also cannot imagine that the Aounists really believe that Al Qaeda is setting bombs in Christian areas.  It takes a special kind of person to believe that Al Qaeda has lost interest in Iraq, in favor of scaring the Maronites and destroying Lebanon's tourist season.  It requires ignorance of the international political situation, any knowledge whatsoever of the international tribunal's imminent creation, and a total lack of understanding of who benefits from chaos in Lebanon.  But, in some ways, it no longer matters what Aoun thinks.  He has made his bed with Hassan Nasrallah and Syria, and now he needs to sleep there.

And then, of course, there are the Palestinians. There are many questions about how Lebanon will look different after the latest battle; there is one certainty.  Naher el-Bared will be half-destroyed and there will be many Palestinian civilians among the dead.  The abject poverty that the Palestinians live in will become more abject, the already-high potential for radicalization among the Palestinians will become higher.  The Arab governments, which claim to fight on behalf of the Palestinian cause, should be disgraced by their refusal to integrate Palestinians within their own countries.  Some things never change.

Details of An Explosion

From Vladimir Nabokov's Details Of A Sunset:

[T]he flush of a fiery sunset filled the vista of the canal, and a rain-streaked bridge in the distance was margined by a narrow rim of gold along which passed tiny black figures.

In case there was any doubt, that is not an accurate description of what Aley looked like yesterday. But it is a pretty quote and I wanted to share. Here are some more pictures from Aley -- for more, head over to From Beirut To the Beltway.

Who Does the Opposition Blame?

But down to business.  It is an ugly fact of life that, as an American, you get blamed for many of the region's problems.  Some of these criticisms are valid and some of them are not, and you need to pick your battles.  Here is one battle that is worth fighting: the storyline which blames America for Fatah al-Islam and the recent slew of bombings.

That is the narrative that Seymour Hersh is advancing, and which Hizbullah mouthpiece Al-Manar happily passes on:

[T]he idea was to get support, covert support from the Saudis, to support various hard-line jihadists, Sunni groups, particularly in Lebanon, who would be seen in case of an actual confrontation with Hezbollah - the Shiite group in the southern Lebanon - would be seen as an asset, as simple as that.

As the story goes, these groups were groomed by America and Siniora to be their attack dogs against Hizbullah, and then turned on their owners.  It totally ignores the larger international situation.  It is just a coincidence, according to Hersh, that these attacks are happening when the international tribunal is on the verge of creation.  Syria could not be involved, because after all they are allied with Hizbullah and the Sunni Islamists don't like Shi'a either.

There are many objections to this line of thinking, but I want to focus on just one of them right now.  Hersh (who was a great journalist, though you are excused for not noticing) credits Syria with more rationality than the United States.  When the confused CNN anchor asked why -- if neither country was ideologically aligned with Fatah al-Islam -- it makes sense for America to be funding the terrorists but not Syria, Hersh answered, "You're assuming logic by the United States government."  And that is about as far as the opposition's ridiculous explanations for the recent violence extends: forget the regional situation, forget who benefits from chaos in Lebanon.  Dick Cheney sure is sketchy, isn't he?

P.S. I'm off to Alay now.  Expect pictures and a report later.

Temporary Relocation

I have been trying to think of a metaphor to describe the paradox behind this post, and have finally settled on one that relies on the near-universal appeal of Western pop culture. Let's assume you are talking to Jordin Sparks, the new, 17 year-old winner of American Idol. Let's say you're talking about music, and at one point in the conversation she grabs your arm and says, "I just heard this great, new band! They have a really good guitarist, and play with a lot of energy. You should check them out! They're called the Rolling Stones."

I'll be guest-blogging over at the Rolling Stones of Beirut blogs, From Beirut To the Beltway, for the next few days. I'll be sure to double-post content here, but the conversation will probably be over there. I mean, the conversation is generally over there anyway, but I'll be leading it for a few days.

More Catholic Than The Pope

The fidgety man on the left we know well, so let's not talk about him. The woman on the right of the picture is where the story is. That is Asma al-Assad, Bashar's wife. She holds dual British-Syrian citizenship, and was born and raised in London. That's where she met Bashar, when he was training there to be an opthamologist. Here's the New York Times Magazine's gossip on her:

"The daughter of a Syrian cardiologist, Asma al-Akhras grew up in London and graduated from the University of London. She did stints as a banker in New York, first with Deutsche Bank and then with J.P. Morgan, where she worked in mergers and acquisitions. She loved New York, and while she lived in a corporate apartment uptown, she wants it to be understood that she preferred to hang out downtown. She also worked in Paris, and she speaks French and Spanish. She has relatives in Houston.

I want to leapfrog here on my earlier comments about Nancy Pelosi, and a note Michael Totten left in the comments.. Do you notice anything interesting about Ms. Assad? She's not exactly your typical stay-at-home wife. More to the point, she's not veiled. Nancy Pelosi presented herself as a more observant Muslim woman than her hosts.

I think the relevant point here is not about cultural sensitivity, but about understanding how foreign societies really work. If Pelosi had gone to Iran (God forbid) and veiled herself, I wouldn't have a problem. As a foreign diplomat, one needs to find common ground with different cultures, and adapting to respect their beliefs is a part of that. But the fact that Pelosi put on a veil in the wrong situation speaks volumes. It is just one more piece of evidence that she didn't know what she was doing.

(image: Taryn Simon for The New York Times. July 10, 2005. NYT Magazine.)

Taking Responsibility

First, let me just reiterate a point that I touched on earlier. One can believe two things about Syrian involvement at this point. Either Bashar al-Assad is behind the violence, or he is the most astute political observer on the planet. How else to take his comment about how the region would be "set on fire" if the international tribunal was passed? Does Bashar have a magic ball which told him the international tribunal would be the final straw for (of all people) the Sunni Islamists and the Palestinians?

I hate to be glib about this. It's a serious issue, and it deserves a serious response. But the politics behind the latest violence do not seem that hard to unravel. Let me be more blunt -- they seem blindingly obvious. Sometimes, when people in the Middle East talk about their eternal conflicts, they will pause, shake their heads, and say, "it is very complicated." They are normally wrong. The fundamentals of the conflict are not particularly complicated, they are merely hard to resolve. There is a difference.

Obviously, the only people who are responsible for the violence in Tripoli and the murders in Beirut are those who were involved in planning and carrying out the attacks. But it is also important to look at the people whose actions allowed the violence to occur. And at the top of that list has to be Nancy Pelosi and her trip to Damascus. When Bashar al-Assad saw her sitting there, veiled and smiling, all that he thought was: "the Americans need me now. I can run wild throughout the region, and they are powerless to respond."

Pelosi met with Assad, she said, "with no illusions, but great hope." Some reporter needs to ask her what has happened to that hope. He could also ask her if she regrets going to Damascus. However, I think I already know how she would answer. Lebanese lives are less important than sticking a finger in Bush's eye.

World On Fire

In some ways, war reporting is the worst journalism that appears in a newspaper. It is mindless. Visit the bomb site, talk to people present, record the number of dead and injured, snap a few pictures. The dead are the story; there is no need to make sense of it, to explain what occurred and why. And then people buy the newspaper, gasp a little at the pictures, read about the number of dead, and consider themselves informed.

So here, again, are facts. A bomb exploded in Verdun last night, an upscale, predominantly Sunni Muslim, area. Nahar is reporting that a suspect is in custody. In the north, an Islamist group who nobody had ever heard of a few months ago is still fighting the army. Gee, Bashar Assad must be the world's most astute political analyst to guess that the region would be "set on fire" if the UN passed the international tribunal. There's a guy that should be picking lottery numbers today.

In all seriousness, all eyes should be on the opposition now. Can Aoun and Berri still stomach their close relationship with Syria? How far will the opposition be willing to push the crisis, and how will pro-government forces respond? Paradoxically, all of these questions and answers get pushed to the back while the bombs are still exploding, before the smoke clears. After all, this is war journalism.

The Bombs Come Here

A bomb exploded in the parking lot of the ABC Achrafiyeh Mall last night, killing one woman and injuring ten. Hopefully, people will stay calm.

For non-Lebanese people reading the blog, the target of this bombing is important. Achrafiyeh is a glitzy Christian neighborhood whose inhabitants are no friends of Syria. The ABC Mall, in particular, is an upscale shopping mall with Western stores and Western prices. In addition to being a convenient place where many Lebanese gather, it is symbolic of Lebanon's Westernized, affluent population who see no connection between themselves and Syria or radical Islamists.

Just Another Little Massacre

The Western narrative regarding the worst internal violence in Lebanon since the civil war differs significantly from what the Lebanese are saying, and the Lebanese narrative makes more sense.

First, the facts. There was a bank robbery in Amyoun (a town southeast of Tripoli) two days ago, and the robbers made off with $125,000. The police suspected members of Fatah Islam, an armed Sunni Islamist group based in the Nahr el-Bared Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli, of responsibility. They raided an apartment in Tripoli, looking to arrest the criminals. Then all hell broke loose. Fatah Islam fought back, and at the moment 21 people are dead, including 13 soldiers.

The Western media is framing this is as a battle between the Lebanese Army and Al Qaeda -- or alternatively, between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinians. "Islamic militants, security forces battle in Lebanon," reads CNN's headline. The article notes how the central government has difficulty dealing with "pockets of insecurity across the country that are haven for militants and troublemakers," a reference to the Palestinian refugee camps. Indeed, the camps are black holes for Lebanese sovereignty -- the army is not allowed to enter, which gives radical militias the chance to gestate.

It would be wonderful news if the Western media was right. Though Al Qaeda or Palestinian radicals killing Lebanese soldiers is obviously not optimal, neither conflict fits into the larger narrative of Lebanon's current problems. The country is not going to fall back into civil war over Al Qaeda or the Palestinians. There simply isn't a segment of the Lebanese population willing to go to bat for either group. If the Western storyline is to be believed, what we have is a tragic battle -- but one that is largely incidental to the larger forces currently at work in Lebanon.

But Lebanese politicians have a different explanation for the violence. Future politician Ahmad Fatfat had this to say: "There is someone trying to create security chaos to say to world public opinion: 'Look, if the tribunal is established, there will be security trouble in Lebanon'."

I don't think the identity of the "someone" that Mr. Fatfat refers to is all that difficult to determine. Certainly, it's not Osama bin Laden who is hellbent on stopping the formation of the international tribunal. No, it's Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian government who the pro-government forces are accusing of causing the chaos in Tripoli. It's another reminder of the price Lebanon will pay if it continues with its ridiculous opposition to Syrian domination.

Stagnant (Lebanese vs. Palestinian) or previously non-existent (Lebanese vs. Al Qaeda) political conflicts do not normally erupt all at once into the worst internal violence Lebanon has seen in seventeen years. Violence usually simmers for a while, before reaching a boil. More likely, these attacks are part of the continuing Syrian effort to sow chaos across Lebanon. Different chapter, same book.

P.S: If any of you had heard me speak about Lebanon's "ridiculous opposition to Syrian domination," you would have recognized immediately that I was being sarcastic. As it is, sarcasm is much harder to convey in print than it is in the spoken word. Nevertheless, please read that sentence in the tongue-in-cheek manner it deserves and requires.

The Difference A Year Makes

"In the old Syria (for which read: that of Hafez al-Assad), Bunni told me, he would have been bundled into a car in broad daylight and taken to a jail cell somewhere. But Syria was changing, Bunni said. It had opened up to the world through the internet, it had a younger president in the form of Assad’s son, Bashar, and Bunni said that his appearances on pan-Arab satellite television channels effectively provided him with cover to speak out.

Less than a year after I met him, Bunni was bundled into a car in broad daylight and thrown into a jail cell after he signed a petition calling for improved Lebanese-Syrian relations. After almost a year in jail, he was finally put on trial on charges of spreading false or exaggerated news that could weaken national morale, affiliating with an unlicensed political association with an international nature, discrediting state institutions and contacting a foreign country. In April, he was sentenced to five years in jail.

Read the whole thing.

Tripartite Chaos In Gaza

Fatah is fighting Hamas in Gaza, and Israel is helping. According to Ha'aretz, 7 Hamas "activists" (a word which inappropriately calls to mind the young Greenpeace people soliciting funds on Hamra Street) were killed by an IAF airstrike yesterday. If I was guiding Israeli policy, I would try to be a little more subtle about which side I was supporting.

If Fatah does come out on top of this latest conflagration, they are going to have to deal with the repercussions of being seen as the choice of Israel and the United States. And it is an open question how any Palestinian party with that judgement hanging over its head could possibly negotiate a lasting peace with Israel. It is almost enough to make one nostalgic for the days of Yasser Arafat. Almost.

A Little History

In response to an commenters' question, it seems Bernard Lewis was referring to an event on September 30, 1985, when Sunni militants killed one Soviet diplomat and kidnapped three others. The three were subsequently released.

Time magazine wrote an article after the event, titled "Moscow Loses Its Immunity." It should theoretically be available here, though Time.com seems to be misbehaving. In any event, the headline was proved wrong by history -- the Soviets were gaining immunity.

No Government, But Shiny Teeth

It may be hard to believe, but there are many countries in the world with worse political situations than Lebanon. Their banks just normally don't provide loans for plastic surgery and orthodontics. That's quite a luxury, for a country without a functioning government.

I want to write about this at greater length later, so I'll cut myself short here. But if anyone has any insights into how these luxuries can be so popular in a country that finds itself in such a dire political position, I'm all ears.

Truth is More Depressing Than Fiction

"Guns and bullets...are doing the talking," in Palestine these days, says the BBC. "The Palestinian unity government is something of a fiction," reports the New York Times. On the day when Palestinians were supposed to be commemorating the Israeli theft of their land (as they see it) -- the one way thing that could plausibly unite them -- they were busy killing each other.

In this situation, one shouldn't need a lot of fancy words to convey disgust. Most of the world doesn't really care about the Palestinian nationalist claims to their homeland, or Zionist claims for Greater Israel, or Islamist desires to establish a sharia-based state, or Israeli desires to create a liberal democratic state. They would just like people to stop killing each other. And given that simple requirement, there is no conceivable way to argue that the Palestinians deserve a state of their own. It doesn't even look like they want it.

Ambivalent Imperialists

Americans, obviously, have a desire to export their values -- we believe that respect for individial rights, democracy, and all those good things are universal values which the rest of the world will benefit from respecting. Manifest Destiny is part of our political culture. But it is a part that we're remarkably ambivalent about. To wit, Bernard Lewis:

"A few examples may suffice. During the troubles in Lebanon in the 1970s and '80s, there were many attacks on American installations and individuals--notably the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, followed by a prompt withdrawal, and a whole series of kidnappings of Americans, both official and private, as well as of Europeans. There was only one attack on Soviet citizens, when one diplomat was killed and several others kidnapped. The Soviet response through their local agents was swift, and directed against the family of the leader of the kidnappers. The kidnapped Russians were promptly released, and after that there were no attacks on Soviet citizens or installations throughout the period of the Lebanese troubles.

There are plenty of examples of successful imperialist states. There are plenty of examples of successful isolationist states. But I cannot think of a state which has prospered by trying to radically change the rest of the world, and then scampering away at the first sign of trouble. In Iraq, and to a lesser extent in Lebanon, the next decade will be about elevating our commitment -- or throwing our hands up and walking away. Here's hoping for sticking around.

Some Sort Of Justice

The United States is pushing the United Nations to establish the Hariri tribunal before the end of the week. It is going to be interesting to see how Lebanese politics will shift once the tribunal is a reality, instead of just an issue to fight over.

On the one hand, Lebanese should know not to expect Bashar al-Assad to be dragged into a courtroom in handcuffs. For that matter, he announced long ago that no international tribunal will be allowed to try any Syrian national. So, unless international pressure convinces Bashar to change his mind (unlikely, unless it comes from Iran) or the tribunal uncovers facts so damning that no denial is possible, there is the good chance that the tribunal's major effect will be in the realm of public opinion.

Whether or not the investigation ends with the bad guys in jail, the tribunal represents an opportunity to broaden the popular consensus that Syria and its Lebanese allies were responsible for Hariri's assassination. Syria's henchmen are perfectly well aware of this, and have been working to undermine the tribunal even before its founding. Even if they cannot prevent its creation, they can destroy its credibility among their supporters -- that is to say, the very people the tribunal needs to convince.

Hizbullah MP Ali Ammar was the latest anti-tribunal voice: "The United Nations will be held responsible for any Security Council resolution that pushes Lebanon into discord, and we warn against such a decision." I love how these people speak about discord as if it is something that just pops up from the ground, like flowers in spring, without acknowledging their own role in creating it.

Once the tribunal is founded, the battle turns towards the minds of regular Hizbullah, Amal, and Aoun supporters. If the tribunal's credibility can be maintained among these people, the support for the March 11 parties will suffer. If not, it will just be a lot of words on a piece of paper.

Egyptian Sand On Beirut Shores

Sietske has great pictures of Beirut's recent sandstorm, which featured Saharan sand blown up into the atmosphere and then down over this little, green country. She uses the Egyptian sand as a jumping off point to talk about the interconnectedness of the region, and the ease and frequency (okay, maybe just the frequency) with which people cross its borders.

Violence in Pakistan

39 people died after a protest in Karachi turned violent. The protest was centered around the arrival of the suspended Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudry, who was recently ousted by Musharraf.

It appears Chaudry was too independent for Musharraf, arguing for an independent role for the judiciary and holding casing involving "forced disappearances" by the intelligence services -- you know, evil things like that.

The Drumbeat Continues

A week after democracy activist Kamal Labwani received a 12-year prison sentence by a Syrian court, two more dissidents have been sentenced to 3-year prison terms for "weakening national sentiment." Michael Kilo and Mahmoud Issa's crime was advocating a normalization of relations with Lebanon.

Meanwhile, an-Nahar is reporting that Assad, while talking to UN Secretary General Ban, "threatened to set the region on fire, from the Caspian to the Mediterranean."

I guess the only question is: Should we expect the next US envoy to arrive next month, or the month after?

Dragomans Needed

Almost six years after 9/11 and four years after the invasion of Iraq, the United States government is still not doing enough to train its young people in the languages of the Middle East. That's disgraceful, and short-sighted. The Defense Department recently funded grants worth approximately $2 million for language training . That's better than nothing -- but it is also approximately what the government spends on the Iraq War every two hours.

The frustrating part of all of this is that language training is not particularly expensive. But it is massively undervalued as part of Americans' educations, and within the military hierarchy. The military has different priorities. It would rather have another $250 million jet fighter, which proven so useful in fighting insurgencies.

Riposte

A few days ago, I responded to a commenter named Solomon, who defended Israel's conduct during the summer war. I argued against the culpability of the average Lebanese citizen for Hizbullah's terrorist attacks (there really is no other word for launching rockets at random into Northern Israel). I'm posting Solomon's response, in full, below. Again, I realize that I am preaching to the choir here. But what matters is why and how Lebanese disagree with Solomon.

----
Solomon's response:

"This is based, I think, in a misunderstanding of the political situation in Lebanon. There are plenty of stories of Lebanese who, on the first days of the war, went to their roofs to happily watch the destruction of Hizbullah." [ed. note: this quote is from my original post]

Yes. If they had risked themselves and their families a little by picking up the ball and running away with it - pleading to the West that Hezbollah was now a rebel group acting outside the government and asking for assistance in disarming and removing it - the outcome of the conflict might have been far more satisfactory for them. Yet, just as their fathers did in the 1980s, as soon as the foreigners were fighting their battles the "pro-Western" Lebanese stepped back and said, "Fine, you do it! Now that you're here, I'll just cheer from the sidelines, unless you make a mistake, of course!"

This is a fault in the moral fiber of the Lebanese; they don't consider themselves responsible to enforce the responsibilities of state sovereignty, even as they greedily claim its rights. That's why "the ugly truth" that the West does not have many moral problems with non-Hezb Lebanese who died as a consequence of Israel's retaliation last summer; there was so much Lebanese could do to allieviate things - especially expatriates who have less to fear than most - yet they did not do so, instead rallying behind Hezbollah in its war against Israel, or at least kow-towing to its authority and blaming Israel for their sufferings under the Hezbollah yoke.

Lebanese still fear civil conflict over international warfare, so they forgive other Lebanese far too much. As Michael Totten reported: "The Israelis don't live here. The Israelis live over there so I don't have to forgive them!"

That has to change. The Israelis have been comparitively gentle so far, doing their best to avoid civilian casualties unless Hezbollah was attacking Israel from positions adjacent civilian dwellings - one of Lebanon's many violations under international law.

Lebanon pleaded for a "Lebanese solution" to the Hezbollah problem and Israel's leadership gave Lebanon's leaders one more chance, acquiescing to a Chapter 6 resolution that U.N. troops would assist Lebanese in disarming the "resistance". Lebanon doesn't even require another UNSC resolution to expand UNIFIL's activities throughout the country - yet it does less than nothing, as evidenced by the statements of Lebanon's finance minister in Washington last month, repeating the line from last summer Lebanon wants to charge Israel with war crimes and make it pay restitution!

So I repeat: if Lebanese keep citing Israel's gentility as a reason to remain de facto accomplices to Hezbollah's crime, and even go so far as to pretend that they were victims rather than assisting the victimizers, why shouldn't Israel wage war even more brutally next time?"

From Puppet To Puppeteer

Hizbullah's history is the story of a progression from a Syrian/Iranian client, to an independent actor in Lebanon's political system. In the 1980s, Hafez al-Assad had no difficulty cracking down on Hizbullah when its actions conflicted with his goals.

In the 1990s, Hafez used Hizbullah as a "proxy military force to exert pressure on Israel and as a proxy political force to keep potential opposition to Syria within Lebanon on the defensive." Hizbullah was one of the primary linchpins of Syrian domination of Lebanon, both militarily and politically.

Hafez al-Assad was an equally despotic a ruler as his son, but he was also vastly more competent. With Bashar's ascension to power in 2000, and Israel's withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, Syria's influence over Hizbullah began to wane. The 2005 withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon only sped up this process. The two are still allied on strategic terms -- ousting the March 14 alliance from power -- but Syria can no longer dictate orders to Hizbullah and expect them to be fulfilled.

The loss of Syria's influence on Hizbullah has an important impact on the current crisis. The protection of Syrian interests in Lebanon requires less radical changes than Hizbullah is aiming for. The political agenda of March 14th could be negated by the opposition receiving a minority veto. But Hizbullah dropped this demand four months ago. The "resistance" is rearming, and calling loudly for early elections. In place of the limited goals of their Syrian neighbors, they are amassing power for the Iranian regime and their own agenda. It is almost enough to make a person yearn for the good old days of Hafez al-Assad.

Can Sarkozy Save France?

If Sarkozy wants to revive a stagnant French economy -- which has dropped from seventh to 17th in the world (based on per capita GDP) during the last twenty-five years -- he is going to need to push through some major reforms. It doesn't help that French economics textbooks tell university students that the solution to unemployment is for the government to create more public-sector jobs.

How can Sarkozy neutralize the expected student opposition? The Economist has a devious plan: "Better to learn a lesson from the Maginot Line, and go around: Pass labor reforms over the summer, while students are at the beach."

Saniora's Opinion

Fuad Saniora has an opinion piece in the New York Times today. He uses the Winograd Report to bash Israel, and urges Israel to adopt the Arab Peace Initiative.

On a superficial level, the piece is fairly mundane. It doesn't say anything that one wouldn't expect any Arab leader to say. Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory is illegal, it destroyed Lebanese villages and killed innocent Lebanese civilians, and it should retreat its pre-1967 borders. The piece needs more anger -- reading it, one can forget that Saniora is the leader of a country that was bombed by Israel less than a year ago. If this was any other country's leader writing about a recent war, the outrage would jump off the page. But this is the Middle East, where it is hard to work up a great amount of shock over violence.

If I was a government advisor, I would see the piece's value in its symbolism rather than its content. There is Saniora's name and position, in boldface, in the New York Times -- Fuad Saniora, Prime Minister of Lebanon. The piece does not mention that a faction of Lebanon considers his government illegitimate, but by articulating the interests of his people, Saniora is establishing his legitimacy to an American audience.

There is also the yawning gap between Saniora's rhetoric, and Hassan Nasrallah's. Saniora is positioning himself as the peacemaker, someone who wants to negotiate with Israel rather than engage in a never-ending struggle. This is a point that Saniora needs to hammer home more strongly to his domestic audience. Especially after the summer war, he needs to prove that Hassan Nasrallah isn't the only person in Lebanon who can deal with Israel

The Right Question

Across The Bay asks the right question upon the announcement of Syrian dissident Kamal Labwani's twelve-year prison term: If this is how the Syrian government is going to behave, what exactly was the point of Pelosi and Rice's talking with the Assad government?

Those who want to "engage" Syria always talk about how America can change Syria's policies, through negotiation. But the flip-side of the coin is that Syria will assume their country is at less risk of American retribution, giving them more leeway to crack down on internal opposition. In the end, those who want rapprochement were right -- though not in the way they intended.

Post, and Riposte

It is preaching to the choir to criticize Israel's conduct during last summer's war on a Lebanon blog. But while Lebanese might not need any convincing that Israel behaved reprehensibly, the rest of the world still does. The common view of Lebanon is of a country where terrorists launch rockets at Israeli citizens, and the rest of the country does nothing. Why should Israel spare any part of a country like that? Are the majority of Lebanese complicit by their passivity? This is not how just Israelis, or a small number of Westerners, think. It is mainstream thought.

A commenter named Solomon, who blogs here, represents this viewpoint fairly well. Let me cull some of the main points from his defense of Israel's actions in the summer war.

"Since the U.N. deployment, Hezbollah no longer engages in armed patrols south of the Litani, and many of its arms caches in the area have been discovered and destroyed. Hezbollah has focused its attention on new fortifications/launch sites north of the Litani and the paralyzation and eventual domination of the Lebanese government.

...

If Lebanese choose to value unity over peace, their country will once more become a plaything of the Syro-Iranian axis. Israel, under Olmert, showed great mercy in halting the conflict when it did and doing its best to avoid purely civilian casualties.

Do you think Israel can afford to be so gentle if war breaks out again? I do not. Those Lebanese who think the next war may have as little impact on their lives as the last war did and thus see little need to do anything to prevent it themselves may be gravely mistaken."

First, I think it is necessary to keep one's eye on the ball. The fact that there is not an easy answer for how Israel should deal with Hizbullah does not excuse acting in such a way that weakens Lebanese and Israeli security. Last summer's war revived Hizbullah's flagging support, and provided them with the political momentum to challenge the pro-Western government. Israel only damaged their own position, and the position of anti-Hizbullah Lebanese. Solomon's reference to the destruction of Hizbullah's weapons ignores the fact that Hizbullah itself claims that it has rearmed fully.

But the uncomfortable question about the complicity of normal Lebanese remains. No, Lebanese who lived beyond those bridges in the North weren't launching rockets at Israel, but they weren't doing anything to stop rockets from being launched in their country, either. The West may have practical strategic problems with attacking non-Hizbullahi Lebanese -- but the ugly truth is that they do not have many moral problems.

This is based, I think, in a misunderstanding of the political situation in Lebanon. There are plenty of stories of Lebanese who, on the first days of the war, went to their roofs to happily watch the destruction of Hizbullah. These people cannot be considered pro-Hizbullah in any meaningful sense. They lack the ability to disarm the organization, not the desire. An absence of overt action should not be confused with acceptance of Hizbullah's autonomous, inflammatory role. Attacking them is not only politically stupid, but morally evil.

While We're On The Topic...

Since the wacky hijinks of the US defense establishment provide an endless source of humor, I thought I would relay one more story. In January, some US defense contractors took a trip north of the border, to Canada. They were alarmed to suddenly discover many strange, circular devices. In a confidential Defense Department report, the devices were described as "anomalous," and "filled with something man-made that looked like nanotechnology."

Four months later, what is the verdict on these strange pieces of nanotechnology? They turned out to be...uh, Canadian money. Oops.

The Graffiti Wars

The United States military orders its translators to spraypaint walls in Iraqi cities with inflammatory slogans designed to poison the relationship between Al Qaeda in Iraq, and the local Iraqi insurgency. In Samarra, at least, tensions between the two groups have risen over Al Qaeda's willingness to target Iraqi Security Forces and civilians. "Al Qaeda has killed many fighters from the Islamic Army," reads one piece of United States-sponsored graffiti.

Well, okay. I don't know whether to praise the Army for using increasingly subtle and creative methods to battle the insurgency, or ask if they didn't have better things to do.

The Irrelevant Middle East

The Middle East is economically irrelevant, politically hopeless, and militarily impotent, says Edward Luttak. It is, at least, a provocative article:

"We devote far too much attention to the Middle East, a mostly stagnant region where almost nothing is created in science or the arts - excluding Israel, per capita patent production of countries in the Middle East is one fifth that of sub-Saharan Africa. The people of the Middle East (only about 5 percent of the world's population) are remarkably unproductive, with a high proportion not in the labor force at all."[Emphasis mine]

Should the Middle East be left alone, if it persists in being hopelessly divided and unproductive? It would not exactly be a unique solution: Westerners happily ignore sub-Saharan Africa. But there are, I think, several important objections.
The first involves terrorism, state-sponsored or otherwise. Luttak writes as if two planes hijacked by Middle Easterners did not fly into the New York World Trade Center in this decade. The attacks were made possible by a small population that was incredibly hostile to the Western world, and a broader population that was hostile enough to the West to allow the radicals to act uninhibited. With the spread of nuclear weapons in the region, the threat of terrorism is only going to increase.

The larger objection is more theoretical, but no less important. Westerners like to believe that their belief in individual rights and democracy is not just for white Europeans and Americans. Like any group committed to an ideal, even the Islamists, they see their principles as universally good. The Middle East, with its divided societies and corrupt governments, is a test tube for their beliefs.

No, the Arab-Israeli conflict currently lacks major strategic importance. Similarly, Lebanon could be swallowed whole by Syria tomorrow, without any major change in the regional balance of power. But both countries still attract attention from the rest of the world, as the meeting place of the three major faiths, and the dominant ideologies of the day. For better or worse.

Driving North

A highway leads north out of Beirut. It is too narrow for the traffic these days, but it is a good highway and relatively new. But, as any Lebanese will tell you, many of the bridges which the highway travels over were destroyed by Israel during the summer war. It's a funny thing -- the bridges do not lead to any Hizbullah strongholds. The north is primarily Christian and Druze. The Israeli warplanes purposefully destroyed the infrastructure of the Lebanese who it was counting on as allies in its attempt to destroy Hizbullah.

Why? Efraim Inbar writes, "From the first day of the campaign, [IDF Chief of Staff Dan] Halutz advocated attacking infrastructure beyond southern Lebanon to pressure the Lebanese government to counter Hezbollah."

Michael Totten hits the nail on the head in ridiculing this "strategy." It happens to not only be wildly immoral, but also wildly ineffective. Bombing noncombatants only proved Hizbullah's claim to be the resistance for all Lebanese. When it comes to a choice between Hizbullah and Israel, the Lebanese will choose Hizbullah every time. They may not decide to support Hizbullah if they have the option of a third way -- a vision of an autonomous, prosperous Lebanon -- but that was precisely the choice that Israel took away.

La Bonne Victoire

Monsieur Sarkozy:

"The French have chosen to break with the ideas, habits and behaviour of the past. I will restore the value of work, authority, merit and respect for the nation."

It is more clear what the election of Sarkozy means for US/France relations, than the relationship between France and Lebanon. But, in broad strokes, I think Lebanon will only benefit from a more purposeful and united Western alliance. The great politicians and essayists of the World War II generation made sense of the world by speaking of the Western world as the defender of liberty and individual rights throughout the world. It was a view that was challenged and ridiculed during de-colonization and the Cold War. It would be nice to see its revival, if only a little.

The Brink

The presidential election is increasingly looking like the moment when the power of March 8 and March 14 is revealed. Maybe it will be the moment when the factions decide whether to escalate the current crisis, or return to normalcy.

Michel Aoun declared that Christians will be "shocked" if he was not elected President. As Abu Kais describes, Aoun isn't exactly enamored with the Taif agreement, which provided that that the President should be elected by two-thirds of the Parliament. He wants the President to be popularly elected, a process which would give the office an independent power base -- and support his short-term political interests, because the current Parliamentary majority is made up of his political enemies.

March 14 deputy Mohammed Hajjar accused Aoun of "breaching the Taif Accord," with this suggestion. Those are fighting words, because it is precisely the Taif Accord which separated Lebanon from the civil war in the first place. If one part of the country sees the other as breaching the deal that ensured the end of the war, all bets are off. The Presidency is too big a prize for either side to swallow a complete defeat -- they will either compromise, or do everything they can to get their way.

It's Not Christmas In Syria

With a rare meeting between the Syria and the U.S. in the books, Michael Young tries to envision what rapprochement would look like. But Young's article reads like the United States' foreign policy Christmas List. It does a very good job of defining what the U.S. wants; it does not explain what we are willing to give in return.

Here is the Christmas List: we want Syria to abandon their attempts to redominate Lebanon, we want them to prevent foreign fighters from entering Iraq across the Syrian border, we want them to negotiate with Israel, and we want them to agree to allow the international tribunal to judge Syrian officials implicated in the murder of Rafiq Hariri.

These are good goals. If they were made a reality, the world would be freer and more just. But it is only acknowledging reality to note that Bashar al-Assad isn't going to acquiesce out of the goodness of his heart. He is going to want something in return -- and Young doesn't define what it is the United States is prepared to give.

Young identifies two Syrian interests: a desire to reimpose its hegemony over Lebanon, and "regime survival." With regards to the first item, Young flatly (and rightly) opposes letting Syria back into Lebanon. As for affecting the survival of the Assad regime, the United States is in no position to seriously threaten to topple the Syrian government. Maybe if the invasion of Iraq had gone off without a hitch, and the country was presently a peaceful, pluralist democracy with fields of hopping bunnies, the situation would be different. But that boat has sailed. U.S resources are already stretched thin trying to control the insurgency in Iraq.

The ugly truth is that some of the items on Young's list are going to be sacrificed, in order to secure other items. And that fact explains why Condoleeza Rice was willing to meet with Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem yesterday.

It's Not Christmas In Syria

With a rare meeting between the Syria and the U.S. in the books, Michael Young tries to envision what rapprochement would look like. But Young's article reads like the United States' foreign policy Christmas List. It does a very good job of defining what the U.S. wants; it does not explain what we are willing to give in return.

Here is the Christmas List: we want Syria to abandon their attempts to redominate Lebanon, we want them to prevent foreign fighters from entering Iraq across the Syrian border, we want them to negotiate with Israel, and we want them to agree to allow the international tribunal to judge Syrian officials implicated in the murder of Rafiq Hariri.

These are good goals. If they were made into reality, the world would be freer and more just. But it is only acknowledging reality to note that Bashar al-Assad isn't going to acquiesce out of the goodness of his heart. He is going to want something in return -- and Young doesn't define what the United States is prepared to give.

Young identifies two Syrian interests: a desire to reimpose its hegemony over Lebanon, and "regime survival." With regards to the first item, Young flatly (and rightly) opposes letting Syria back into Lebanon. As for affecting the survival of the Assad regime, the United States is in no position to seriously threaten to topple the Syrian government. Maybe if the invasion of Iraq had gone off without a hitch, and the country was presently a peaceful, pluralist democracy with fields of hopping bunnies, the situation would be different. But that boat has sailed. U.S resources are already stretched thin trying to control the insurgency in Iraq.

The ugly truth is that some of the items on Young's list are going to be sacrificed, in order to secure other items. And that fact explains why Condoleeza Rice was willing to meet with Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem yesterday.

Nasrallah Gets It

Here's what Nasrallah has to say about the Winograd Report. It's surprisingly smart:

"It is worthy of respect that an investigative commission appointed by Olmert condemns him. Even though they're our enemies, it is worthy of respect that the political forces and the Israeli public act quickly to save their state, entity, army and their existence from the crisis."

That is very different from the normal Hizbullah response to Israeli criticism of the Lebanon War. Normally, Nasrallah or his underlings use these opportunities to gloat and brag further about their victory. I assumed Nasrallah didn't understand the value of self-criticism and government oversight, but it seems like I underestimated him. I realize I don't often have many nice things to say about Hizbullah, but good for Nasrallah to recognize the importance of the Winograd Commission.

Goodbye Is Too Good A Word To Say...

On the face of the matter, there is nothing particularly interesting about the Winograd Report. Of course it was a poorly thought-out and incompetently run war. There is nothing in the report that anyone who follows Middle East politics closely shouldn't have been able to discover for themselves six months ago.

What is interesting about the Winograd Report is that it was written at all. A government commission was formed, to examine and criticize the most important decisions of the highest echelons of leadership. That does not happen in Syria or Egypt, or with Hizbullah or Hamas or Fatah, after a failure in the leadership. It did not happen here, in Lebanon, after the civil war. A solid majority of Israelis want Ehud Olmert to resign, and he probably will. After the 1967 war -- a far more disastrous loss for the Arab states than the summer war was for Israel -- the Arab leadership remained in place.

Hizbullah's victory last summer was made possible by an incredibly low standard for success. Hundreds of their soldiers were killed, their rocket supply was decimated, and their headquarters in Bint Jbail and Dahiyeh was reduced to rubble -- but they still existed. Transparency and accountability are two major reasons why Israel is still light-years ahead of their enemies, even after last summer's "defeat."

Democracy In Turkey

Matthew Yglesias is absolutely right when he writes that, "things like the AKP are exactly what we [liberal-minded Americans] should be hoping to see" in the Muslim world. The AKP has Islamist roots but has nevertheless pursued a fairly moderate path. For example, it has pushed for Turkey's membership into the EU. By doing so, they are validating and popularizing a modern and pro-Western version of Islam -- exactly what the Middle East needs more of.

But it is just this progress which Turkey's radical secularists are trying to stop. A Turkish court recently annulled a Parliamentary vote that would have elected a member of the AKP party as President. The army -- the self-proclaimed defender of Ataturk's vision -- issued a strongly worded statement widely seen as expressing their opposition to the AKP candidate for President.

Secular Turks' opposition to all things religious is very French, and is based on the same foundation of laws. Turks should look at the the recent unrest in France caused by the inability to assimilate the Muslim minority, and ask themselves if that is what they would like their country to become.

Congratulations, Hosni

It has been a red-letter week for the Egyptian censors. First, they scared one of the best English-langugae Egyptians bloggers off the Internet. The Sandmonkey has finished his last rant. He writes:

"I no longer believe that my anonymity is kept, especially with State Secuirty agents lurking around my street and asking questions about me...I ignore[d] that, the same way I ignored all the clicking noises that my phones started to exhibit all of a sudden, or the law suit filed by Judge Mourad on my friends..."

Fresh off that success, an Egyptian court sentenced an Al-Jazeera reporter to six months in prison for producing a film about police torture. The crime is "harming Egypt's national interest" -- an ironic charge, given the negative public surrounding Egypt's press crackdown.

Egypt is lashing out at bloggers and the media from a position of weakness, not of strength. If the Mubaraks were comfortable with their hold on power, they would not feel the need to attack bloggers. If someone wrote an article comparing Cairo in 2007 to Tehran in 1975, I would read it.